Gender-related differences in investment decisions : through the lens of equity crowdfunding : an empirical study in collaboration with dealflow by Jørgensen, Ingrid & Tranaas, Nelly A.
Norwegian School of Economics
Bergen, Fall 2020
Gender-related Differences in Investment
Decisions - Through the Lens of Equity
Crowdfunding
An empirical study in collaboration with Dealflow
Ingrid Jørgensen and Nelly A. Tranaas
Supervisor: Steffen Juranek
Master thesis, Economics and Business Administration
Major: Business Analysis and Performance Management
NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS
This thesis was written as a part of the Master of Science in Economics and Business
Administration at NHH. Please note that neither the institution nor the examiners are
responsible – through the approval of this thesis – for the theories and methods used, or
results and conclusions drawn in this work.
Acknowledgements
This thesis was written as part of our master’s degree in Economics and Business
Administration at the Norwegian School of Economics. We are both majoring in Business
Analysis and Performance Management, and find female presence within business to
be truly interesting. We therefore wished to provide a deeper knowledge about female
investors and their impact for the innovation sector. We found this topic to be especially
relevant in light of the increased focus on the investment gap and the relatively low share
of female investors within the Norwegian market.
We would like to express our gratitude to Dealflow for providing data and insight to our
study. We would especially like to thank Jens-Petter Tonning for continuous support
and assistance, and Stine Sofie Grindheim for valuable discussions throughout our thesis.
With your continuous enthusiasm and recognition of the importance of our research, you
have been a great motivation during our work.
We would also like to thank the various experts within our field of study, that we have
been in touch with during our process. By sharing valuable experiences, you have enriched
our master’s thesis with essential knowledge. Lastly, we would like to express our gratitude
towards our supervisor, Steffen Juranek, for providing valuable guidance, exceptional
insights and constructive feedback.
Norwegian School of Economics
Bergen, December 2020




The remainder to progress towards full gender equality requires increased female presence
in financial markets, in particular in investing. The need to better understand female
investment decisions, in an environment traditionally dominated by men, is therefore
crucial. Even though great attention has been paid to general gender differences within
investment behaviour, the extant literature has marginally explored the nature of non-
professional, individual decisions.
The purpose of this study is to investigate how females and males differ in their investment
decisions, by examining Norwegian equity crowdfunding investors. Our research therefore
contributes to existing literature, by exploring whether females have specific characteristics
compared to males in investment behaviour within a high-risk environment. We use a
quantitative method with a qualitative supplement to analyse data retrieved from Norway’s
leading equity crowdfunding platform, Dealflow. Through our analyses, we examine how
female and male individual investors differ in decisions related to risk, herding behaviour,
and homophily.
Our first findings suggest that there are no differences between male and female investors
when observing the choice of risk level. Furthermore, we observe that females do not
tend to follow the crowd, thus they do not exhibit a larger degree of herding behaviour
compared to males. These findings contradict conventional beliefs about female investment
behaviour, as well as similar research from equity crowdfunding, which fosters a discussion
exploring plausible explanations for this within our context. Lastly, our results show
that females have a higher tendency than males to invest in ventures with a female
entrepreneurial team. Investment decision is therefore partly influenced by homophily,
leading investors to choose entrepreneurs similar to themselves in terms of gender.
As we have examined an emerging field in entrepreneurial finance, our thesis provide
practical implications going forward. We want to further highlight the overall implications
and avenues for further research from our study, as we explore, to our knowledge, relatively
new reasons for differences (similarities) in investment behaviour.





2.1 The gender investment gap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 The early stage ecosystem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3 Females receives less funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.4 A shift in the investing landscape: Crowdfunding . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.4.1 Equity crowdfunding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.4.2 Crowdfunding market potential . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3 Hypotheses development 11
3.1 Investment decisions in crowdfunding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2 Gender-related differences in investment decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.2.1 Female risk-aversion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.2.2 Herding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.2.3 Homophily . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.3 Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4 Data 17
4.1 Data source . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.1.1 Data Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.2 Variable description and summary statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2.1 Dependent variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2.1.1 Risk level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2.1.2 Herding behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.2.1.3 Homophily . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.2.2 Independent variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.2.3 Control variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.2.3.1 Firm level control variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.2.3.2 Investor level control variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.2.4 Descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.2.4.1 Campaigns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.2.4.2 Individuals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5 Methodology 28
5.1 Quantitative method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.1.1 Data structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.1.2 Ordinary least squares method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.1.2.1 Heteroscedasticity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.1.3 Logistic regression model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.1.3.1 Interpretation of coefficients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.2 Qualitative method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6 Analysis 32
6.1 Results seen from the choice of risk level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
6.2 Results seen from herding behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
iv Contents
6.3 Homophily in investment decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
6.4 Robustness test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
7 Insight from the investor sample 40
7.1 Investor characteristics and motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
7.2 Risk assessment and investment choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
7.3 Herding behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
8 Discussion 44
8.1 Gender-related differences in risk and herding behaviour . . . . . . . . . 44
8.1.1 Female risk aversion in a gender equal society . . . . . . . . . . . 45
8.1.2 The influence of investor characteristics and less female experience 46
8.2 Females do not necessarily follow the crowd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
8.3 The influence of homophily in investment decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
8.4 Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
8.4.1 Data quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
8.4.2 Limitations related to research design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
8.5 Implications for Dealflow and equity crowdfunding practitioners . . . . . 51
9 Conclusion 54
9.1 Research implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
9.2 Further research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
References 57
Appendix 63
A1 No perfect collinearity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
A2 Homoscedasticity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
A3 Analysis 3 with robust standard errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
A4 Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
List of Figures v
List of Figures
2.1 Funding sources of an entrepreneurial firm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 Norwegian Crowdfunding values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.1 Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.1 Illustration of proportion invested of campaign target . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.2 Industry overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
7.1 Result from survey question 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
7.2 Result from survey question 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
vi List of Tables
List of Tables
4.1 Campaign statistics N=47 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.2 Summary statistics N= 2,189 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.3 Summary statistics and t-test across gender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.4 Association between investor and CEO gender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.5 Association between investor gender and entrepreneurial team . . . . . . 27
6.1 Analysis of choice of risk level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6.2 Analysis of herding behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
6.3 Analysis of homophily . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
6.4 Robustness test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
A1.1 Pearson correlation matrix sub-analysis 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
A1.2 VIF-test sub-analysis 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
A1.3 Pearson correlation matrix sub-analysis 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
A1.4 VIF-test sub-analysis 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
A1.5 Pearson correlation matrix sub-analysis 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
A1.6 VIF-test sub-analysis 3 (Female CEO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
A1.7 VIF-test sub-analysis 3 (Female-led) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
A2.1 Breusch pagan test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
A3.1 Analysis of homophily with robust standard errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
A4.1 Overview of survey and answers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
1
1 Introduction
Decades of improvements in fundamental equal rights and labour market participation,
for women around the world, have contributed to economic growth and incrementally
narrowing the so-called “gender gap” (Hilson, 2007)(OECD, 2018). While rising female
employment rates (Gompers & Wang, 2017) have resulted in higher wages and enabled
economic independence for women, participation in financial markets still stands as a
remainder for gender equal wealth and ownership (DNB, 2019). To further foster and
realise benefits from female participation, in an environment dominated and based on
knowledge from men, it is crucial for institutions and financial practitioners to seek new
insight (Fidelity International, 2019).
Financial inequalities between genders also in the Nordic countries sheds light on an
existing paradox, as the region elsewhere stands as a world pioneer in gender equality
(OECD, 2018). Statistics reveal that Norwegian males had 53 BNOK more capital income
in 2017 compared to their female counterparts, owned 80 % of private stock values and
founded 80 % of all new companies (DNB, 2019). Numerous initiatives and campaigns have
addressed the need for change, encouraging increased female participation in investments
in particular. Moreover, promoting the gender investment gap has evidently had a positive
effect, and in the last quarter of 2019 it was reported that the count of new female investors,
for the first time in history, was equal to that of males on the Oslo Stock Exchange (Telle,
2020).
In this era of change, new possibilities for investing have also opened up in entrepreneurial
finance. By making cases more accessible and the process easier than traditional investing
(D. J. Cumming et al., 2019), the emergence of online alternative funding sources such
as crowdfunding is said to “democratise” the investment process and thus improve the
diversity of funding sources (Mollick & Robb, 2016). In particular this enables increased
participation for non-professional individuals, including female investors. A more diverse
investor pool can further be said to benefit female entrepreneurs, as it is evident that
they are not given access to funding to the same extent as males (Malmström et al.,
2017)(Unconventional Ventures, 2019). This reveals an additional dimension of financial
inequality, and research suggests that “a combination of risk aversion, gender investment
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bias, and lack of female representation among investors and founders creates a vicious
circle that is difficult to break” (Fackelmann et al., 2020). As female founders are shown
to benefit from both alternative funding sources and female investors (Unconventional
Ventures, 2019) - the democratising of investing potentially represents an important change
for female entrepreneurs going forward (Pompian, 2016)(Gafni et al., 2019).
The aforementioned contextual state highlights the advantages of an increased share
of female investors, both for the purpose of gender equality itself, and the case of
funding access for female entrepreneurs. Existing studies of female investors in particular,
show evidence that there are gender-related differences in investment behaviour, with an
emphasis on females being more risk averse than males (Croson & Gneezy, 2009). However,
the majority of studies investigate these differences through savings, experiments, and
corporate business decisions. As entrepreneurial finance until now has been restricted to
professional investors, there are few studies exploring how non-professional individuals
make investment decisions within a high-risk environment (Ahlers et al., 2015)(Vismara,
2016). Furthermore, the majority of knowledge on crowdfunding has been provided from
research on reward-based models, which has limited applicability to equity crowdfunding
as an investment-based model. Combining the need for increased knowledge of female
investment behaviour and decisions in investment-based crowdfunding, only a few studies
have examined a similar issue (Mohammadi & Shafi, 2018)(Hervé et al., 2019).
This thesis contributes to research concerning gender-related differences in investment
decisions within equity crowdfunding. To our knowledge, there is still room for
improvement in studying how female individuals actually distinguish from men traditionally
dominating the investment environment. Assuming that there is a collective striving for a
more gender-equal investor pool, increased knowledge about female investment decisions
will help various stakeholders pivot to improve products and practices. Open-access
platforms such as equity crowdfunding and a growing female investor population in the
Norwegian economy, represent new possibilities for this cause. Hence, our research question
is:
How do gender-related differences in investment decisions occur in the context
of equity crowdfunding?
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By investigating the investor side of this emerging financing source, we provide insight
into a limited understanding of the decision-making process that takes place in this
context. Drawing on the logic borrowed from Mohammadi and Shafi (2018), we explore
gender-related differences in choice of risk level and herding behaviour. Furthermore, we
look into the presence of homophily in investments decisions, to emphasise the implications
of an increased share of female investors. We analyse data collected from Dealflow, the
leading equity crowdfunding platform in Norway, by quantitative method and a qualitative
supplement. Our findings present three sets of evidence regarding gender-related differences
in investment behaviour. Contrary to previous research, we find that there is no difference
between female and male investors in chosen risk level, as well as in herding behaviour.
Lastly, we present confirming evidence suggesting that female investors tend to choose
female entrepreneurs within our context.
Scope
Our study is limited to investors, who constitute the supply side of equity crowdfunding.
Thus, we do not explore entrepreneurial decisions or venture success. In addition, we will
not focus on financial differences in amount invested, hence limiting the scope to other
aspects of decision-making. Further, we want to limit the scope of this thesis to individual
investors, that is to say, private individuals. As the gender investment gap both refers
to a skewed gender distribution in private investments, but also includes too few female
decision-makers in institutional investing, this is an important restriction to our study.
Outline
In the next chapter, we will provide relevant background information on the current state
of our research context. From this, we take the reader through hypotheses development in
chapter 3. We will here present a theoretical view on investment decisions, together with
relevant studies of gender-related differences, which sequentially result in three hypotheses
chosen to explore our research question. We then present our data and our choice of
methodology used to test the hypotheses in chapter 4 and 5. As we have chosen both
quantitative and qualitative methods, our analysis results will be given for each of these
separately in chapter 6 and 7. Our findings will lastly be discussed thoroughly, before we
sum up by highlighting the limitations and implications of our research in chapter 8. We
conclude with answering our research question and suggest avenues for further research.
4
2 Background
This chapter provides contextual topics to our defined research question and will therefore
form the foundation for this thesis. First, we will present the gender investment gap and
its closing potential. As our research focus is on entrepreneurial funding, characteristics of
the early-stage ecosystem will then be provided. We will from this elaborate on the gender
funding gap and its relevance for our study, as few female investors are amongst several
explanatory factors for a disproportional allocation of funding. Potentially fostering a
more diverse investing environment, crowdfunding as an emerging risk capital investment
platform will then lastly be presented.
2.1 The gender investment gap
Despite an overall increase in female labour participation, wage rates and equal societal
opportunities, women still consequently earn and invest (thus own) less than men (Fidelity
International, 2019)(DNB, 2019). The reason for a low share of female investors, thus the
gender investment gap, is complex. The most immediate reason is a lower amount of female
wealth and capital to engage in investment activities. Even for countries with a relatively
narrow wage gap, males still have more capital income than their female counterparts. As
presented in the introduction, this is the case for Norway, and highlights the distinction
between salary and income from return on investments (DNB, 2019). Literature further
points to a lack of knowledge, financial interest and confidence (Fidelity International,
2019). Looking at traditional characteristics of investment firms and communities, it can
also be argued that females cannot get access to the so-called “boys clubs”, and thus miss
out on good investment cases as opportunities to grow their wealth. Lastly, research
suggests that women in general tend to exhibit higher levels of risk aversion, and as a
result undertake fewer investments (Croson & Gneezy, 2009)(Barber & Odean, 2001).
The first step towards improvement can said to be awareness. As highlighted in the
introduction, campaigns providing information about the gender investment gap, and
status quo has resulted in an all-time high of new female investors on the Oslo Stock
Exchange, showing a promising trend going forward (Telle, 2020). Furthermore, traditional
boundaries have been pushed by technological advancements as they make cases more
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accessible and the investment process easier (Vassallo, 2016). One can see this as a sequence
where digitalisation offers a more commercialised funding process, which subsequently
enforces a more diverse investor pool (D. J. Cumming et al., 2019), and evidently increase
female presence on the funding side (Pompian, 2016)(Gafni et al., 2019). As an example,
Kickstarter, a European reward-based crowdfunding platform, reported a female share of 44
% on the backer side for 2015, which stands as a vast contrast to other female participation
rates in financial settings. Thus, use of online platforms is said to “democratise the
investment process” (Mollick & Robb, 2016), and therefore has the potential to benefit
underrepresented investors such as females (Vassallo, 2016).
2.2 The early stage ecosystem
As our research examines investing in entrepreneurial ventures, we want to define the
early-stage ecosystem as a common basis. From the company life cycle, the early stages
refer to the development, start-up and early growth phase. In these early stages, the
entrepreneur often struggles to get loans from banks or later-stage private equity investors,
because of lack of credit history and uncertainty of future cash flows. Therefore, these
phases require different sources of financing, often notated as “early-stage investments” or
“venture capital funding". The investors providing such funding agree to take a higher risk
than institutional players, in return for an ownership share/stake in the targeted company
(Caselli, 2020)(Lehner et al., 2015). As shown from figure 2.1, investors can be a range
of sources: informal investors such as friends and family, professionals at venture capital
(VC) firms, seed funds and angel investors (Fackelmann et al., 2020). The emergence of
alternative funding sources, such as crowdfunding and syndicates enabled by technology
platforms, further makes individual non-professionals an additional investor type, who is
not displayed in figure 2.1.
Because early-stage investments are based on investors’ own judgement of the
entrepreneurial team and their idea, challenges of human decision biases arise. Research
on discrimination in funding addresses how these have consequences, in particular as
access to capital can be seen as the most important component for enabling innovation to
accelerate its impact (Lerner, 2010)(Malmström et al., 2017)(Unconventional Ventures,
2019). Therefore, investment decisions and dynamics in this context serve as a relevant
field of study to improve early-stage funding mechanisms.
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Figure 2.1: Funding sources of an entrepreneurial firm
(Caselli, 2020)(Malde, 2016)
2.3 Females receives less funding
A report mapping Nordic start-up funding from Unconventional Ventures, reveals that of
the total risk capital (2.3 BnEUR) invested in 2019, only 1.4 % was invested in female-only
entrepreneurial teams. Mixed entrepreneurial teams received an average of 6 % of the total
funding, which leaves male-only entrepreneur teams with almost 93 % (Unconventional
Ventures, 2020). Even though 85 % of the start-ups for this period were indeed male-only
teams, women still get smaller average tickets - consequently 13 -
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3 of the funding that
male or mixed teams receive (Unconventional Ventures, 2020). This is supported by the
fact that women teams landed 7 % of all deals in the Nordics from 2016 to 2020, but
only 2,5 % of the capital as a Nordic average. The numbers are even more significant
looking outside the Nordic region, where 20 % of all start-ups are founded by women, who
respectively get 19 % of the deal count, but only 3 % of the amount of capital invested
(Abouzahr et al., 2018). This phenomenon shows a disproportional allocation of funding
to female entrepreneurs, which is referred to as the gender funding gap (Fackelmann et
al., 2020).
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Considering that female founders, or their presence in a mixed team, are shown to deliver
better financial results per dollar raised (Unconventional Ventures, 2020)(Abouzahr et al.,
2018), the economic rationale is eliminated as a possible explanatory factor for the existing
funding gap. Research on behalf of the European Investment Bank and the European
Commission suggests that “a combination of risk aversion, gender investment bias, and
lack of female representation among investors and founders creates a vicious circle that is
difficult to break” (Fackelmann et al., 2020).
Humans have a tendency to choose people based on shared characteristics (Greenberg &
Mollick, 2017), and recent research has put an emphasis on the lack of female investors as
a constraint for female entrepreneurs (Unconventional Ventures, 2020). Oranburg and
Geiger (2019) found that female angel investors support female-led ventures to a greater
extent than male investors, even when controlling for other factors such as industry group
and firm characteristics. The low number of female investors can also be a barrier for
female entrepreneurs to apply for external equity, as research points to the fact that women
entrepreneurs were significantly more likely to apply for funding from angel networks
having a higher proportion of women investors (Becker-Blease & Sohl, 2007).
Furthermore, statistics show that alternative funding sources, such as crowdfunding
(sources that are not traditional corporate/PEVC funding) account for a higher
percentage of total capital raised for women-led ventures than for men and mixed teams
(Unconventional Ventures, 2020). This can be interpreted as that female entrepreneurs
indeed can benefit from access to a wider audience, and a chance to enter the funding
process with fewer biases or prejudices from a homogeneous investor group (Gafni et al.,
2019)(Malmström et al., 2017).
2.4 A shift in the investing landscape: Crowdfunding
The concept of crowdfunding started as sporadic independent fundraising initiatives of
small amounts aimed at large audiences, as an alternative to raising large sums from
a small group of sophisticated investors (Belleflamme et al., 2014)(Shneor et al., 2020).
As entrepreneurs and early-stage companies faced difficulties in accessing capital after
the 2008 financial crisis, crowdfunding emerged mainly as a funding method providing
early-stage funding (Malde, 2016). In recent years, the phenomenon of crowdfunding
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has been widely enabled by new technology and digital platforms to create a market for
both fundraisers and funders which is highly accessible and without standard financial
intermediaries (Mollick & Nanda, 2016)(Vassallo, 2016). Crowdfunding offers a “win-win”
to all three parties involved; the fundraiser, the backers and the platform facilitator.
Categorised within “new, alternative financing”, this global industry financing volume
reached USD 371 billion in 2017 (Ziegler et al., 2019)(Shneor et al., 2020).
Crowdfunding is an umbrella term for a variety of fundraising models, where the distinction
is from its underlying logic of either facilitating investments or non-investment financing
(Shneor et al., 2020). The investment types of models are predominantly based on equity
crowdfunding and crowd-lending, whereas the non-investment models are mainly reward
and donation crowdfunding. The different models are aimed at different types of backers,
whereas the investing models’ participants are to a greater extent motivated by financial
returns than, for example, social motivation or solidarity (Vismara, 2016). For the purpose
of our research, we will further limit our focus to investments, more specifically the equity
crowdfunding model.
2.4.1 Equity crowdfunding
In equity crowdfunding, the fundraisers are entrepreneurs, the backers are equity
investors, and the platform facilitator is often a knowledgeable player offering quality
and trustworthiness of the fundraising via their platform. The crowdfunding platform
enables entrepreneurs to seek an undefined large number of potential investors, exceeding,
but also simplifying, their existing fundraising from family and friends, and potential
angel investors or VC firms (Gafni et al., 2019). The investor receives an equity share in
the venture in return for the capital invested (Malde, 2016), and has a rather long-time
horizon (Shneor et al., 2020).
The equity crowdfunding investors can be a diverse group in terms of background and
motivation for investing, whereas studies point to financial returns as the main motivation
(Baeck et al., 2014)(Cholakova & Clarysse, 2015). The accessibility results in a range of
experience levels, from individuals who have no professional affiliation with investing, to
professional angel investors and VC firms (Lukkarinen, 2020).
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Disregarding motivation or experience, a denominator to highlight is the high-risk profile
which characterises early-stage investors in general, and in particular equity crowdfunding.
Investing equity relative to grant loans in these early company stages ensures the highest
risk possible (Shneor et al., 2020). Due to this, equity crowdfunding platforms employ
filtering procedures to ensure quality of projects published (Hornuf & Schwienbacher, 2017).
As a result, equity models present some of the highest success rates among campaigns
approved for publication across all crowdfunding models and also the highest levels of
funds raised per ticket (Shneor et al., 2020).
2.4.2 Crowdfunding market potential
As leading crowdfunding markets such as the USA, UK and Canada have experienced
sharp growth rates, immature markets still represent huge potential growth opportunities
in achieving the same amounts invested. In the Nordic market, this is in particular true
for Norway as a “late-mover” relative to mature peer markets such as Sweden and Finland.
The Nordic region invested 450 MEUR through crowdfunding in 2018 (Weldeghebriel,
2019), mainly in Sweden and Finland, but the growth rates represented in figure 2.2 give
reasons to be optimistic regarding the potential also in Norway.
The figure 2.2 shows a 10x increase in capital raised through crowdfunding in Norway
from 2016 to 2019. Correspondingly to the global statistics, equity crowdfunding is a
small portion of the Norwegian market, but platforms such as Dealflow and Folkinvest are
experiencing substantial growth. Figures for 2020 show that the market will overshoot a
100 % growth from 2019 equity volumes, which suggests an promising outlook for this
funding source (Dealflow, 2020).
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Figure 2.2: Norwegian Crowdfunding values
(Shneor, 2020)
An accelerating growth in combination with the impact previously highlighted in
this chapter represents a great potential for equity crowdfunding. Given that the
democratisation of the investment process is a fact, the emergence of funding sources such
as crowdfunding may therefore foster a higher participation of females (Gafni et al., 2019)
on both the investor and entrepreneurship side going forward (Vassallo, 2016).
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3 Hypotheses development
In this chapter, we will present our hypotheses formulation. To analyse gender-related
differences aligned with our research topic, it is first necessary to review relevant theory
and empirical literature on investment decisions. This will therefore be provided, followed
by perspectives on differences between genders within our context. We will sequentially
through the chapter present our three hypotheses chosen to explore our research question.
3.1 Investment decisions in crowdfunding
Decision-making is a complicated multi-step process of choosing a particular alternative
from other available options. In financial markets, the decision-makers are investors
who need to consider personal, technical, and situational factors depending on their
particular investment environment and the market psychology (Shunmugathangam, 2017).
Emotions and cognitive errors affect decision-making processes and perception of risk,
addressing the need to understand how investors’ decisions are influenced by behavioural
and psychological theory (Kumar & Goyal, 2015)(Pillai & Achuthan, 2015).
Baron (1998) suggests that decision-making in an environment with a high level of
uncertainty and time constraints, places a strain on information-processing capabilities,
and therefore involves high levels of emotion (Oaksford et al., 1996). Such an environment
is consistent with the venture capital markets, highlighted in our presentation of the
early-stage ecosystem. Thus investors in these environments are prone to behavioural
deviations, such as overconfidence and loss aversion, and cognitive biases related to
information-processing and herding behaviour (Pompian, 2016). Moreover, characteristics
in a crowdfunding environment will make the decision process extra prone to specific
uncertainty components.
As explained in the previous chapter, limited financial metrics and company track record
in early-stage investing causes the investor to face a high risk, as he/she makes decisions
based on a subjective and not fully informed judgement. A crowdfunding setting will
potentially aggravate this information asymmetry between the entrepreneur and the
investor. First of all, the entrepreneur often suggests his/her own valuation to the
crowdfunding platform, which potentially could cause higher valuations from natural
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incentives (Cooper et al., 1988)(Busenitz & Barney, 1997). Secondly, aforementioned
subjective biases can potentially be exacerbated for individual investors on crowdfunding
platforms, as they most likely on average have limited experience, time and resources to
perform any proper due diligence (Mohammadi & Shafi, 2018). In addition, Hon-Snir et
al. (2012) found that more proficient investors are less affected by behaviour biases. It is
therefore natural to assume that biases will influence individual investors who are present
on crowdfunding platforms, as they often are non-professionals.
3.2 Gender-related differences in investment decisions
Previous research on gender differences in investment decisions, suggest that females tend
to be more risk-averse and have less confidence than males (Barber & Odean, 2001)(Croson
& Gneezy, 2009). Drawing on the logic from Mohammadi and Shafi (2018), we have
therefore chosen to explore risk and herding behaviour as components that may distinguish
female and male investors in investment decisions. Further, due to the characteristics of
investment decisions in the early-stage environment presented in the previous chapter,
we have chosen to explore the influence of homophily. The funding gap for female
entrepreneurs motivates us to examine how the gender of the investor affects investment
decisions within this context.
3.2.1 Female risk-aversion
Research tends to show different investment patterns for female and male investors, with
a particular emphasis on the explanation that females in general tend to be more risk
averse (Byrnes et al., 1999)(Hinz et al., 1997)(Croson & Gneezy, 2009). Explanations for
a difference in general risk preferences between genders are often made from a biological
point of view (Felton et al., 2003)(Zuckerman, 1994).
While the vast majority of research on women in financial settings reports that women
are more risk averse than men, there are a few that has demonstrated that the differences
are smaller than popularly assumed (Kaplan & Walley, 2016). They suggest that when
examining the presence of female risk aversion, and how it materialises in investing,
variables that have been typical for females, such as lower wealth, confidence, educational
levels and financial knowledge, affect decision-making to indicate risk aversion (Harikanth
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& Pragathi, 2013)(Nelson, 2015)(Nelson, 2014). Dwyer et al. (2002) found that one cannot
observe a significant negative relation between risk-taking in investments and females
when including control for investment knowledge. Supporting this, Hibbert et al. (2008)
found evidence that women are indeed no more risk averse than men when controlling for
education and financial knowledge. On the other hand, their research further states that
gender difference in risk aversion is more significant for portfolios with high risk (Hibbert
et al., 2008). Supporting traditional knowledge, several studies report a consistent risk
aversion for females even when controlling for age, income and other control variables, and
find no correlation between risk taking in investing and knowledge or education (Olsen &
Cox, 2001)(Jianakoplos & Bernasek, 1998)(Agnew et al., 2003).
Research results have emerged from different contexts such as experiments with lotteries,
empirical studies with personal wealth and pension savings, indicating that the specific
context may be an important boundary condition (Kaplan & Walley, 2016). Some studies
are completed in an equity crowdfunding context, even though research on investment
crowdfunding is limited due to its recent emergence. Hervé et al. (2019) use data from
both equity crowdfunding and crowd-lending, and their results show that women invest
less in the riskiest equity investments. They argue that the difference between the genders
comes from female risk aversion. Research from Mohammadi and Shafi (2018) found that
females are less likely to invest in younger firms, technology firms as well as ventures
having a higher percentage of equity offered. Their results support the idea that female
investors are more risk averse than males in an equity crowdfunding setting.
To sum up, accumulated research on gender risk-taking in investment decisions both
favours the theory that females are more risk averse than males, but also suggests that it
is caused by other factors than gender. As we examine a high-risk environment, and recent
research from equity crowdfunding supports female risk aversion, our first hypothesis is
therefore:
H1: In equity crowdfunding, we expect to observe that female investors are
more risk averse than males
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3.2.2 Herding
Research from Croson and Gneezy (2009) supports the view that women are more risk-
averse investors than men, but also points to the fact that psychological biases such
as overconfidence may influence female and male investors differently. Overconfidence
causes people to be too confident about their skills and knowledge, which may lower
the perception of risk (Busenitz & Barney, 1997)(Palich & Bagby, 1995). Croson and
Gneezy (2009)’s findings suggests that this bias for male investors could drive the observed
differences in risk attitudes between men and women. In addition, they state that male
investors tend to be even more overconfident in uncertain situations (Hervé et al., 2019).
Lin (2012) proposes that the level of confidence will have an impact on herding behaviour
through the effect of risk tolerance. In the financial market, herding can be defined
as mutual imitation causing a convergence of actions (Hirshleifer & Hong Teoh, 2003).
Investors have a tendency to follow the investment decision taken by the majority, and
therefore imitate the judgment of others (Alrabadi et al., 2018)(Kumar & Goyal, 2016).
According to Liñán et al. (2011), investors are more prone to mimic the action of others,
or groups, in situations where there is a higher degree of uncertainty and sequentiality in
information production. Both of these conditions are strongly represented in crowdfunding
(Mohammadi & Shafi, 2018), and herding is cited as a prominent feature within this
context (Colombo et al., 2015)(Vismara, 2016)(Hornuf & Schwienbacher, 2015).
As herding is defined as following decisions taken by others, a confident investor who has a
higher risk tolerance is therefore less likely to form herding bias (Lin, 2012). Furthermore,
literature also suggests that women are in general less confident than men (Barber &
Odean, 2001).
According to the theoretical perspectives presented, this should subsequently cause males
to follow the actions of others, to a smaller extent than females. Thus, it is natural to
assume that females are more susceptible to herding biases, which led us to formulate our
second hypothesis:
H2: In equity crowdfunding, we expect to observe a higher level of female
herding behaviour
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3.2.3 Homophily
Considerable attention has been devoted to understanding how between-individual
similarity, namely homophily, has an influence on decision-making. Research indicates that
decision-makers tend to rate people that resemble themselves more positively (Knockaert
et al., 2010). Characteristics such as physical appearance (Feingold, 1988), personality
(Byrne et al., 1967), demographics (Tsui et al., 1992), and values (Meglino & Ravlin, 1998)
can influence the decision-making process in early-stage funding by favouring individuals
similar to the investor (Murnieks et al., 2011).
As already presented in chapter 2, highlighting the funding gap for female entrepreneurs,
female investors are more likely to invest in female-led startups and female CEOs (Oranburg
& Geiger, 2019). This is a tendency for both genders, further proven by Horvat and
Papamarkou (2018), where it was found that investors and entrepreneurs of opposite
gender were significantly less likely to connect.
Moreover, studies from Brush et al. (2014) found that VC firms with women partners
were twice as likely to invest in companies with a woman on the management team (34 %
vs. 13 %), and three times more likely to invest in companies with women CEOs (58 %
vs 14 %). Unconventional Ventures (2020) reported similar tendencies within the Nordic
VC ecosystem. According to Gafni et al. (2019), there is also evidence of gender related
homophily within reward-based crowdfunding, and that the tendency increases along with
the increased share of females on the founder team. To our knowledge, the relationship
has yet to be confirmed in an equity crowdfunding setting.
From this, it is natural to expect that homophily may influence investment decisions
within our empirical setting, and we lastly present our third and final hypothesis:
H3: Female investors in equity crowdfunding are expected to be more likely to
invest in female-led start-ups than males
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3.3 Hypotheses
To summarise, the combination of the increased focus on female investing and the
emergence of crowdfunding as a democratising funding source motivates us to contribute
to increased knowledge about female investors with this research. Through our three
hypotheses about female investment decisions, we will examine our research question. Our
hypotheses relate to the research question in the following way:
Figure 3.1: Hypotheses
Figure 3.1 shows how our research will be structured in the following, and how our analyses
examining our research question are divided in a systematic way.
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4 Data
This chapter presents the data set used in the quantitative analysis. The first two sections
include a presentation of the empirical setting of the data source, followed by the sample
selection. The third section provides a variable description, followed by a presentation of
the final sample through descriptive statistics.
4.1 Data source
This paper uses data collected from Dealflow, an independent equity crowdfunding platform
based in Norway (Dealflow, 2020). The data set consists of investments in early-stage
unlisted ventures in exchange for equity share in the business (Vulkan et al., 2016).
Dealflow launched in 2017, when crowdfunding was still an immature market in Norway,
as seen from the graph presented in the crowdfunding chapter. In a rising market, Dealflow
aims to be the country’s most effective platform for ventures in need of financing, and
individuals looking to invest in exciting growth companies. With 8000 investors and a
market share of 75 %, it is “the largest equity crowdfunding platform in Norway”, followed
by Folkeinvest (Dealflow, 2020). By early 2020, it had facilitated equity investments of 116
MNOK for 42 companies, with an average ticket size of 35.000 NOK per campaign. The
investors have constituted of 40 % holding companies and a female share ranging from
15-30 %. Dealflow is hence a representative platform to use to gather data for statistical
models and is well suited to our research question.
As an intermediary between companies and investors, Dealflow provides the means for
transactions, through the pre-selection of ventures, the legal groundwork and the ability
to process financial transactions (Ahlers et al., 2015). Investors are given information
about the ventures which includes the entrepreneurial team, the business model and
financial statements. In addition, information concerning minimum and maximum goals,
pre-money value, % equity for sale, minimum investment amount per investor and price
per share is presented for each campaign.
Dealflow has an "all or nothing" policy, meaning that the ventures rely on a successful
campaign to receive equity. A campaign is considered successful when the minimum goal
is reached; if it is not, the entrepreneurs will not receive the amount invested during the
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time period of the campaign. The funds redeemed on the platform can be higher than the
minimum but must be below the maximum goal set by the entrepreneurs.
4.1.1 Data Sample
Our initial data consists of 60 equity crowdfunding campaigns with 3659 individual
investments in the period 2018 to mid 2020. For each campaign, the raw data includes
information about the date the campaign started, the declared minimum and maximum
investment target, pre-money value, %-equity for sale, and the value of each investment
ticket received. Furthermore, each investment is matched to the specific investor, giving
us information on the exact date and time, gender, age, experience and knowledge. The
dimension of knowledge and experience is from prior mappings done internally by Dealflow.
This enables us to analyse both individual campaigns and the behaviour of individual
investors.
To enrich our research range, we have added additional dimensions to our campaign
data. On a company level, information, including industry, the date of establishment, and
gender of CEO, CFO and founders, has been collected from Dealflow’s website, Campaign
Memorandums, Samfunns- og næringslivsforskning AS (SNF) and the Brønnøysund
Register Centre. The companies are grouped based on SSB’s Standard Industrial
Classification. SIC2007 is used in classifying business establishments and other statistical
units by the type of economic activity in which they are engaged (SSB, 2016). SIC has
five levels; section, division, group, class and subclass. In our thesis we will divide the
companies into overall industry groups by using the highest level “section”.
In order to obtain a suitable sample for our research question, we further excluded
observations that are not representative. To avoid bias in our estimates, we exclude
investment amounts over 1 900 000 MNOK. In conversations with Dealflow, we concluded
that these few observations are internal transactions, and thus do not represent external
funding. From the investor birth dates, we further excluded observations for individuals
that were younger than Dealflow’s age limit, in addition to observations that seemed
unusual due to very old age. We further remove observations where investment date is
prior to campaign date, as this may reflect an internal transaction. In addition, campaigns
that only received one or two investments are removed from the final sample. Due to odd
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characteristics, we believe that these campaigns may not give representative insight to our
analyses. Finally, we exclude investments done by holding companies. This is due to the
fact that we want to analyse individual investors and gender differences within investment
decisions. As holding companies might consist of several individuals which could include
both females and males, it was natural to exclude these observations. To sum up, the
final sample includes 47 campaigns with 2189 unique investments. Since some firms have
done multiple campaigns, the data set consists of 45 unique Norwegian ventures.
4.2 Variable description and summary statistics
In the following, a detailed description of the variables used in the analyses are presented,
in addition to a remark on the relevance of the chosen variables. First, the dependent
variables are presented, followed by the independent and control variables.
4.2.1 Dependent variables
4.2.1.1 Risk level
There are several observed characteristics of firms that can influence investors in the
decision-making process related to the risk of future cash flows. One variable of risk is
equity offered by the venture, meaning the maximum amount of shares the entrepreneur
is willing to sell during the campaign. This is a calculated ratio from the equity offered
over the total valuation of the venture.
According to Leland and Pyle (1977), the entrepreneur’s willingness to invest in his
own project can serve as a signal of project quality. They point to a high level of
information asymmetry between entrepreneurs and investors, where firm owners possess
more information about their projects compared to external investors. If the entrepreneurs
are optimistic about the future cash flow of their venture, then they will try to retain
a large amount of the equity shares (Vismara, 2016). This suggests that the value of
the firm thus increases with the share of the firm held by the entrepreneur. Given this,
investors might perceive high equity offerings as a negative signal. In addition, a higher
equity offering can have a negative effect on the entrepreneurs’ incentive to commit to
their company (Mohammadi & Shafi, 2018). Taking these elements into consideration, it
is likely that more equity offered signals higher risk to the investors.
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Other common variables of risk could be financial ratios, which are used by investors to
evaluate the financial health of a firm (Martani et al., 2009). As stated, representative
financial statements are available to a limited extent for an early-stage company. From
this, and the investor’s limited ability, time and resources to do financial due diligence,
we do not include financial ratios as a proxy for risk in our analysis.
To summarise, the dependent variable of our first analysis to investigate the choice of risk
in investment decisions, namely H1, will be the level of equity offered by the venture. It is
important to note that the dependent variable will be the choice taken by the investor to
invest in a specific campaign, with a given level of equity offered, already decided by the
entrepreneur.
4.2.1.2 Herding behaviour
For our hypothesis H2, we want to explore whether we can observe gender-related
tendencies within the phenomenon of herding. One could argue that the number of prior
investors is a good indicator of the so-called “herding effect” (Jiang et al., 2018). However,
investors using Dealflow do not get access to this information. They instead observe the
amount invested per campaign and how far it is from its minimum goal, and thus success.
This is proportion is visualised by a bar as shown by figure 4.1, and easily accessible for
the investors.
We therefore define a herding measure based on the ratio of cumulative amount invested
as a proportion of the campaign target. Investors can easily observe this information
as it is displayed for each campaign, and one can argue that it reflects prior investors’
collective traction of a certain campaign. It is reasonable that investors demonstrate
herding behaviour if the cumulative amount invested, compared to the campaign target,
has a positive effect on the decision to invest in the campaign. Thus, herding will exist
if individuals have a tendency to invest in campaigns with a higher ratio of cumulative
amount invested to the campaign target. This because they are relying on the judgment
of others.
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of proportion invested of campaign target
4.2.1.3 Homophily
The dependent variable in our third analysis is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a venture is
female-led. First, we identify a venture as female-led based on the condition that the CEO
is female, due to the fact that this is the key individual behind the proposed campaign.
We then expand the indication of female-led start-ups to include that a) at least one of
the main managers of the firm is female (CEO and CFO), and b) at least one of the
founders is female. This enables us to explore how likely it is that investments are made
between individuals of the same gender, given the share of female- and male-led start-ups
and investors.
4.2.2 Independent variables
To be able to analyse gender-related differences, we use investor gender as the independent
variable in all analyses. Female investor is a binary variable with the assigned value equal
to 1 for investors that are females and otherwise 0.
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4.2.3 Control variables
When testing hypotheses, one has to control for different factors that may affect investment
behaviour other than gender. The control variables are divided into two main categories:
campaign/firm level and investor level.
4.2.3.1 Firm level control variables
There are several observed characteristics of the individual firm that can influence investors
in the decision-making process. We include the natural logarithm of pre-money value in
Norwegian kroner (NOK), later referred to as valuation. Pre-money value is a common
measure to include when evaluating start-ups, and it is an estimated or notional value of
a firm prior to investment round (Köhn, 2018)(Callow & Larsen, 2003).
Due to the fact that some companies may lack quantifiable data such as operating statistics
and performance indicators, there is a high level of uncertainty concerning pre-money
value. However, it can, to some degree, signal project quality due to the fact that many
factors have been assessed when evaluating the different firms. A higher pre-money value
can therefore attract investors, and Hervé et al. (2019) found that the pre-money valuation
was significantly and positively associated with ticket size. In contrast, a high pre-money
valuation may also indicate an overvalued company, and investors could be hesitant to
invest if they perceive the valuation of the firm to be overestimated (Messica, 2006).
We further control for industry effects to account for unobserved heterogeneity between
campaigns. Previous research has provided support to the fact that industry membership
has an influence on firm profitability and start-up valuation (McGahan & Porter,
1997)(D. Cumming & Dai, 2011). By controlling for industry, we also isolate gender
differences as it is likely that this will have an effect on the decision-making. In addition
to industry effects, we include year fixed effects. Since the sample consists of investments
over three years, it is likely that there could be some variation in the degree of platform
legitimacy, or other factors that may change over time that could influence the investment
decisions.
For the analysis of herding behaviour, we include the share of days passed for each
campaign. The variable indicates the number of days passed since the campaign started
over the planned duration. The variable can provide information concerning the percentage
4.2 Variable description and summary statistics 23
of funding, and it is natural there is a positive relationship between proportion of campaign
target invested and share of days passed (Mohammadi & Shafi, 2018). Furthermore, we
include investment frequency for the analyses of risk level and homophily. Investment
frequency is based on the number of prior investors divided by days that have passed
since the campaign started. The values indicate the traction of the different campaigns,
which may affect the investors’ assessment related to attractiveness of the investment
(Mohammadi & Shafi, 2018).
We use the dependent variable in each analysis as a control variable for the respective
other. As stated in chapters 2 and 3, female investors might be more likely to invest in
female-led campaigns, and we therefore control for female CEO in first two analyses. Risk
level will most likely affect any investment, and we therefore include level of equity offered
as a control in last two analyses.
4.2.3.2 Investor level control variables
For investor characteristics, we include several demographic factors as control variables.
We control for investors’ age, as the investment preferences may vary between investors of
different ages. As older investors are closer to retirement, they may invest in less risky
assets (Hervé et al., 2019). It is therefore natural to think that the age of the investor will
have a negative relationship with the equity offering and lead to more herding behaviour.
Thus, we control for investors’ birth date to eliminate such potential effects on investment
decisions.
Furthermore, as some studies, highlighted in chapter 3, suggest that female risk aversion
might be influenced by certain factors, we include variables for experience and knowledge.
The variables are estimated, based on previous questionnaires done by Dealflow. The
questions aimed to assess both their knowledge of investing and previous experience, and
each individual is given a score within the two categories. The questions within knowledge
are fact based, while the experience questions ask whether they have invested in unlisted
companies before and if they have a related profession/education. We have therefore
made a total possible score of 5 and 3, respectively, for experience and knowledge. It
is reasonable to think that investors with experience and knowledge will look at certain
criteria to make their assessment of target companies. Thus, this may subsequently result
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in different investments. The choice of separating the two categories is based on an
assumption that practical experience may affect investment decisions in different ways
than theoretical knowledge.
4.2.4 Descriptive statistics
This section presents descriptive statistics of the data used in our analyses. We describe
the campaigns and an overview of the included industries, in addition to statistics for the
complete sample and for each gender. Finally, we present data concerning the distribution
of investors across gender of the CEO and entrepreneurial team.
4.2.4.1 Campaigns
As mentioned above, the sample consists of 47 campaigns with 2189 investments. Of
the 47 campaigns, as many as 87 % were successful, meaning that the campaign reached
its campaign target. Table 4.1 shows statistics at the campaign-level calculated based
on one observation per campaign, leading to 47 observations. As mentioned, 45 of the
campaigns in the data sample are unique companies. However, the key variables such as
equity offering and campaign target are different for each campaign even though it is the
same company.
Table 4.1: Campaign statistics N=47
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Equity offering (%) 17.77 9.94 4.83 45.880
Firm age 4.23 5.00 0 22
Valuation 32,167,687 25,717,938 3,000,000 118,274,000
Campaign target 1,757,403 2,377,799 200,000 15,000,000
Max funding target 4,947,975 4,555,670 800,000 25,000,000
Further, the data sample consists of campaigns within 10 industries. From graph 4.2, we
can observe that information and communication is a heavily represented industry in the
data sample. This is natural due to digitalisation and the increased focus on technology
across industries. The information and communication sector includes start-ups in software
development, web portals, data processing and other information technology. Thus, a
broad definition of this subsection explains why a majority of the campaigns are in this
industry. In addition, there are several sectors which only include one campaign, which
4.2 Variable description and summary statistics 25
leads to an uneven distribution of observations across industries. Finally, we see that
campaigns with a female CEO are only present in four of the 10 industries.
Figure 4.2: Industry overview
4.2.4.2 Individuals
Table 4.2 provides descriptive statistics of the dependent variables for the first two
analyses; equity offered, proportion invested of campaign target, and all the control
variables. Comparing the table to the descriptive statistics for the campaign level, one
can observe a change. This is because the individual campaigns do not receive the same
amount of funding and therefore the number of investments will vary. This implies that
the data is unbalanced, where some campaigns consist of 490 investments while others
only consist of around five. There is a strong difference between median and mean ticket
size, indicating that the distribution of investment amount is negatively skewed.
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics N= 2,189
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Median Min Max
Equity offering (%) 15.970 7.317 16.67 4.830 45.880
Proportion inv. of campaign target 1.666 1.416 1.321 0.001 6.495
Investor age 39.935 12.345 38 18 99
Knowledge 4.432 0.813 5 1 5
Experience 1.567 1.002 2 0 3
Firm age 3.694 3.996 2.54 0.455 22.611
Ticket size 20,746 61,762 7,500 1,000 1,499,995
Valuation 43,320,057 26,175,481 45,000,000 3,000,000 118,274,000
Campaign target 1,846,417 1,475,782 1,497,600 200,000 15,000,000
Share of days passed 0.496 0.326 0.4815 0 1
Investment frequency 24.391 40.922 3.462 0 176
In table 4.3, we can observe the descriptive statistics of the same variables in table 4.2
when splitting the data sample into male and female investors. From the table, we observe
that females account for fewer observations, as 20 % of the investments are done by
female investors. Within our sample, females have invested in ventures with a higher
mean of equity offering than males. However, the t-test does not show a significant
difference. On the other hand, looking at the proportion invested of campaign targets,
females have a lower ratio than males and the difference is significant. The male investors
are slightly more experienced, possess more knowledge and are on average younger than
females in our sample. Furthermore we see that females have a tendency to invest smaller
amounts compared to males, in addition to investing in campaigns with lower valuation
and campaign target. By only looking at the descriptive statistics, we therefore confirm
that there exist gender-related differences in investment decisions, and already observe
certain tendencies within our sample. This fosters an interesting basis for our analyses to
investigate what may drive these differences.
Table 4.3: Summary statistics and t-test across gender
Statistic Male N=1745 Female N=444 t-test
Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev t-value p-value
Investor age 39.32 12.34 42.35 12.10 -4.6364 3.754e-06
Knowledge 4.46 0.80 4.33 0.84 3.0062 0.002676
Experience 1.68 0.98 1.12 0.97 10.878 2.2e-16
Firm age 3.81 4.17 3.25 3.17 2.6221, 0.008799
Ticket size 22,652 67,605 13,255 27,874 2.8672 0.004181
Valuation 45,359,207 26,136,925 35,305,830 24,776,821 7.3119 3.677e-13
Campaign target 1,919,242 1,514,415 1,560,198 1,274,785 4.5981 4.506e-06
Proportion inv. of campaign target 1.75 1.45 1.35 1.21 5.2349 1.808e-07
Equity offering (%) 15.84 7.35 16.46 7.18 -1.5845 0.1132
Share of days passed 0.51 0.32 0.45 0.33 2.9876 0.002843
Investment frequency 25.83 41.86 18.75 36.50 3.2591 0.001135
Table 4.4 shows the distribution of the number of investments across the gender of investor
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and CEO, which is the dependent variable for the third analysis. In our sample, 78.7 % of
the startups were run by male CEOs, and, when looking at the 1745 male investors, only
13.5 % invested in start-ups with a female CEO. Furthermore, we see that females have a
higher tendency than males to invest in female CEOs. Of the 444 investments done by
females, 33.1 % were invested in startups with female CEOs.
Table 4.4: Association between investor and CEO gender
Male CEO Female CEO Total
Male investor 1509 236 1745
Female investor 297 147 444
Total 1806 383 2189
Table 4.5 presents the association between the gender of the investor and the entrepreneurial
team. In our sample, 72.3 % of the campaign consisted of male-led startups, meaning that
the CEO, CFO and founders were all males. We observe that a larger proportion of male
investors invested in female-led teams compared to female CEOs, with an increase from
13.5 to 19.4 %. The same tendency is present in female investors, where the proportion
that invested in female-led startups increased from 33.1 to 43.2 %.
Table 4.5: Association between investor gender and entrepreneurial team
Male-led Female-led Total
Male investor 1407 338 1745
Female investor 252 192 444
Total 1659 530 2189
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5 Methodology
The purpose of the following chapter is to present the methodology applied to test our
hypotheses. We will first introduce the structure of our data, before presenting the
methods used for the quantitative main analysis. Lastly, we will present the qualitative
method, and motivations for including this as a supplement to the quantitative analysis
investigating our research question further.
5.1 Quantitative method
5.1.1 Data structure
There are generally three ways of structuring data when performing an empirical analysis;
cross-sectional data, time-series data, or panel data (Wooldridge, 2016). Our data sample
consists of 1501 unique investors, meaning that 68% only invested once during the time
period from 2018 to 2020. As we thus do not have the same individuals repeatedly over
the same period of time, we are not able to conduct panel data analysis when testing the
hypotheses. Due to the information provided by the data set, we will treat the sample as
cross-section individual-level data. Furthermore, the campaign level allows us to include
a time dimension when looking at individual investments relative to the campaign time
frames.
5.1.2 Ordinary least squares method
For our first two analyses, we estimate how gender differences affect risk assessment and
herding behaviour, using ordinary least square (OLS) regressions. The method estimates
unknown parameters by minimising the sum of squared residuals, between the observations
in the data set and the model prediction (Wooldridge, 2016). For linear regressions with
multiple independent variables, the basic equation is as followed:
Ŷ =  0 +  1X1 +  2X2 + ...+  iXi (5.1)
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5.1.2.1 Heteroscedasticity
The OLS method provides the best linear unbiased (BLUE) estimator as long as certain
conditions are met. The assumption of homoscedasticity requires that the variation in the
residuals, given any value of the independent variables, is the same (Wooldridge, 2016).
In the case of heteroscedasticity, the standard errors are both biased and inconsistent.
This results in reduction or inflation in statistical power, and inaccuracy in the estimation
of lower and upper bounds on confidence intervals (Hayes & Cai, 2007). To check for
heteroscedasticity, we use the Breusch pagan test for each model, where a p-value below
5% will lead to a rejection of the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity. To overcome the
problem with heteroscedasticity, we calculate robust standard errors. In addition, due
to structure of the data, it is natural to assume that there will be some correlation for
observations within the same campaign. This will cause within-cluster error correlation,
which may result in very misleadingly small standard errors (Cameron & Miller, 2015).
To account for this in our sample, we further use clustered robust standard errors, where
the investments are grouped into clusters based on the campaign level.
5.1.3 Logistic regression model
Linear regression models are inappropriate when testing the third hypothesis. This is
because the dependent variable is not measured on a ratio scale and the error terms are
not normally distributed (Czepiel, 2002). Thus, we use logistic regression when looking
more closely into the relationship between investors and the entrepreneurial team in terms
of gender. The method consists of statistical models which evaluate the relationship
between a dependent qualitative, dichotomic variable, or variable with more than two
values, and one or more independent explanatory variables (Domínguez-Almendros et al.,
2011). Logistic regressions or so-called logit models take the natural logarithm of the odds
that some event will occur. This is necessary to create a linear relationship between a
categorical outcome variable and its predictor(s) (Peng et al., 2002). The simple logistic
model with logit transformation is as follows:
logit(Y ) = ln
p
(1  p) =  0 +  X1 + ✏ (5.2)
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The goal of logistic regression is to estimate the unknown parameters   for the equation.
Least squares estimation is not able to produce minimum variance unbiased estimators for
logistic regressions (Czepiel, 2002). Thus, the method uses maximum likelihood estimation
which is designed to maximise the likelihood of reproducing the data given the estimated
parameters (Peng et al., 2002).
As explained in the data chapter, the dependent variable for the third analysis is a binary
variable, with the value 1 if the CEO of the company is female and otherwise 0. The
independent variable will be the binary variable indicating the gender of the investor.
By using a logistic regression, we will, in the presence of homophily, expect that female
investors are more likely to choose campaigns with a female CEO compared to male
investors. Thus, a female investor should increase the probability that the campaign
invested in has a female CEO. When further expanding the analysis to female-led startups,
we expect to observe the same tendency.
5.1.3.1 Interpretation of coefficients
Compared to a linear regression, the interpretation of the impact size of a coefficient
is not as simple for logistic models. The coefficient and its value say something about
the direction of the relationship between the independent variable and the logit of the
dependent variable (Peng et al., 2002). Thus a   larger than zero will imply a larger logit
of Y. However, we cannot observe the absolute change in probability of an outcome by
only looking at the coefficients. To obtain a more meaningful and intuitive interpretation
beyond just the direction of the effect, marginal effects are often reported. The marginal
or incremental effect shows the effect of an independent variable on the probability that
the dependent variable is equal to one (Norton & Dowd, 2018). Marginal effects thus
indicate an absolute change in the probability of an event while holding all other variables
constant.
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5.2 Qualitative method
We use a qualitative method to gain further insight into the characteristics of the investors,
in order to better understand investment choices within our sample. The main motivation
for the qualitative analysis is to capture aspects that may not be represented by the
quantitative main data. The insight will be used as a supplement to the discussion for
the quantitative analysis, to enable a richer interpretation of our findings. In addition, as
equity crowdfunding is a rather immature market, the qualitative insight enables us to
better understand the empirical implications of our research.
The data for this analysis is gathered through an online survey, including nine questions,
forwarded to Dealflow’s investor pool1. The questions were defined both from formal
guidelines on survey design, and input from Dealflow. Furthermore, the survey was
specifically designed to gain insight into certain judgements in advance of an investment,
their interpretation of information on the platform and the main motivation for investing.
A strategic choice of adding a comment option in several questions further helped us to
get a deeper understanding of some individual preferences. In addition, basic demographic
questions made it possible to explore gender-related patterns and distinctions within the
answers compiled. The data basis for the qualitative analysis consists of 157 responses,
whereby 14% were women, which we see as a representative sample seen from our data set.
It is, however, important to keep in mind the low number of respondents relative to the
number of individual investors in our data set, and also the limited in-depth knowledge
an online questionnaire provides.
In addition to the survey, we conducted a semi-structured interview with Professor Rotem
Shneor, which is leading the Nordic Crowdfunding Alliance and serves as a researcher at
the Cambridge University Centre for Alternative Finance. In the very initial phases of
our research, we also conducted a series of similar informal interviews with other industry
experts. This, along with a tight collaboration with our contacts from Dealflow, has
resulted in a better understanding of the research context. Similar to the survey, the
insight provided through interviews will be used as a supplement to the discussions, in
addition to assumptions made throughout.




This chapter presents the results of our quantitative analysis, which is organised in three
separate parts for the different aspects of our research question. In the first two analyses,
we will present the findings of gender-related differences in risk preference and herding
behaviour. We will further present our results from the third analysis, investigating
whether female investors are more likely to choose campaigns with female CEOs or that
are female-led. Finally, a robustness test is presented to check whether the results are
consistent when looking at only unique investors.
6.1 Results seen from the choice of risk level
The investors’ choice of investing in campaigns with a certain level of risk, seen as equity
offered, is the dependent variable for this first sub-analysis. As this determinant is
presented earlier as a proxy of perceived risk while investing in early-stage ventures,
we want to explore whether females are more risk averse. Female investor is chosen
as our independent dummy variable, and from our H1 we expect a significant negative
relationship which will imply that females choose ventures with lower levels of equity
offering. Table 6.1 presents the results, and the effect of controlling for investor, campaign
and firm specific variables, in addition to industry and year effects.
Column (A) reports a simple specification including only the dummy variable for female
investors. The coefficient is positive but not significant, indicating that there is no
difference between females and males in risk preference measured through equity offering.
Columns (B) and (C) show how the coefficient changes when adjusting for our chosen
investor specific control variables and the investment frequency, presented in the data
chapter. The results reported in the two columns show the same tendency as in column
(A). The specification is further expanded in column (D) to include firm specific control
variables, and we can observe a great increase in R2. By examining the drivers behind
this, we find that valuation alone increases R2 by 0.30. This is natural, considering that
equity offering is calculated from maximum funding target over valuation. When adding
all the control variables together in Column (D), the coefficient at 0.029 is positive and
still not significant.
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Table 6.1: Analysis of choice of risk level
Dependent variable:
Risk levela
Base Individual level Campaign level Firm level Complete
controls controls controls
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Female investor 0.045 0.039 0.080 0.029 0.026
(0.067) (0.072) (0.059) (0.034) (0.029)
Investor age  0.001 0.001 0.0002 0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Knowledge  0.034  0.024  0.013 0.001
(0.024) (0.019) (0.014) (0.012)
Experience  0.007 0.015 0.015  0.009
(0.035) (0.023) (0.017) (0.011)
Investment frequency 0.004 0.007⇤ 0.007⇤⇤
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)




Constant 2.731⇤⇤⇤ 2.926⇤⇤⇤ 2.610⇤⇤⇤ 10.774⇤⇤⇤ 9.231⇤⇤⇤
(0.121) (0.319) (0.124) (1.619) (1.810)
Industry effects No No No No Yes
Year effects No No No No Yes
Robust SE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,189 2,189 2,189 2,189 2,189
R2 0.002 0.007 0.110 0.458 0.665
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.005 0.108 0.456 0.662
F Statistic 3.741⇤ 3.767⇤⇤⇤ 53.895⇤⇤⇤ 263.165⇤⇤⇤ 238.996⇤⇤⇤
(df = 1; 2187) (df = 4; 2184) (df = 5; 2183) (df = 7; 2181) (df = 18; 2170)
aThis variable is logged
Note: The table provides the estimates of the analysis concerning chosen risk level, with the use of ordinary
least squares. Robust standard errors (clustered at the campaign level) are reported in the parentheses
correcting for heteroscedasticity. There is no indication of multicollinearity within the regressions 2. The
dependent variable is log-transformed, which makes the coefficient for female investor a semi-elasticity. A
semi-elasticity gives the relative change in the risk level given that the investor is female. Three stars,
two stars, and one star represent statistical significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 %-level, respectively. The
chosen level of significance for this analysis is set to 5 %.
Lastly, when adding industry and year effects, our coefficient decreases in Column (E). The
coefficient shows a positive relationship between risk level and female investors, suggesting
that females tend to choose ventures with a slightly higher equity offering relative to
male investors, keeping all other variables equal. However, the result is not statistically
significant, and thus we cannot state that there is a difference between males and females.
Our final OLS model estimates therefore imply, surprisingly relative to existing knowledge,
2Correlation matrix and vif-test can be found in the appendix
34 6.2 Results seen from herding behaviour
that there is no statistically significant difference in the choice of risk level for female
investors compared to their male counterparts. Thus, the result favours a rejection of our
first hypothesis H1.
6.2 Results seen from herding behaviour
In our second sub-analysis, the dependent variable is cumulative amount already invested
as a proportion of the campaign target. The dummy female investor is again chosen as
our independent variable. From H2, we expect to observe female herding behaviour from
a positively significant coefficient, as the proportion who have already invested relative to
the campaign target is higher. Table 6.2 presents the results, and the effects of controlling
for individual, firm and campaign specific variables, in addition to industry and year
effects.
Column (A) reports a simple specification only including investor gender, hence we have
not controlled for effects that may influence an investor’s decision other than gender. The
coefficient is negative, suggesting that females tend to invest earlier in campaigns within
our sample. However, the difference is not statistically significant.
The coefficient increases (in terms of difference) in Column (B), when we control for
individual control variables. In addition, it becomes significant at the 5 % level, indicating
a statistical difference between male and female investors. The interpretation of the
coefficient is that females invest in ventures with a 16.4 % lower proportion who have
already invested relative to the campaign target than males. Column (C) shows how
the coefficient changes when adjusting for our chosen firm specific control variables. The
coefficient decreases (in terms of difference), indicating a smaller numerical difference
between the investor gender when we control for other factors influencing the investment
decision. When controlling for share of days passed in column (D), we observe an increase
in R2. This is naturally due to the fact that the cumulative amount invested in campaigns
tends to increase along with days passed.
Finally, the specification in column (E) is further expanded to show our final model,
including year and industry effects together with all the control variables. We see that
the coefficient is still negative at -0.114, and not significant. This suggests that females
tend to invest when the venture has 11.4 % less cumulative invested amount relative to
6.2 Results seen from herding behaviour 35
campaign target than male investors, keeping all other variables equal. However, due to
the fact that the coefficient is not significant, the results demonstrate that there is no
significant difference between male and female investors. Our final estimates from our
OLS model therefore shows, also surprisingly relative to existing knowledge, that female
investors do not exhibit herding behaviour to a larger extent than males. The result
supports a rejection of our second hypothesis H2.
Table 6.2: Analysis of herding behaviour
Dependent variable:
Proportion inv. of campaign targeta
Base Individual level Firm level Campaign level Complete
controls controls controls
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Female investor  0.135⇤  0.164⇤⇤  0.110⇤  0.071  0.114
(0.080) (0.081) (0.061) (0.052) (0.070)
Investor age  0.006⇤⇤  0.005⇤⇤  0.004⇤  0.005⇤
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Knowledge 0.009 0.001 0.008 0.0005
(0.028) (0.025) (0.022) (0.040)
Experience  0.086⇤⇤  0.090⇤⇤  0.079⇤⇤  0.092⇤⇤
(0.040) (0.042) (0.036) (0.040)
Female CEO  0.278  0.220  0.028
(0.240) (0.210) (0.330)
Equity offering  0.008  0.008 0.0003
(0.012) (0.011) (0.029)
Share of days passed 0.892⇤⇤⇤ 2.083⇤⇤⇤
(0.092) (0.132)
Constant 0.873⇤⇤⇤ 1.215⇤⇤⇤ 1.389⇤⇤⇤ 0.844⇤⇤⇤  3.042⇤⇤⇤
(0.146) (0.361) (0.309) (0.251) (0.890)
Industry effects No No No No Yes
Year effects No No No No Yes
Robust SE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,189 2,189 2,189 2,189 2,189
R2 0.011 0.056 0.106 0.415 0.593
Adjusted R2 0.010 0.054 0.103 0.413 0.589
F Statistic 23.960⇤⇤⇤ 32.449⇤⇤⇤ 42.978⇤⇤⇤ 221.006⇤⇤⇤ 175.472⇤⇤⇤
(df = 1; 2187) (df = 4; 2184) (df = 6; 2182) (df = 7; 2181) (df = 18; 2170)
Note: The table provides the estimates of the analysis concerning herding behavior, with the use of ordinary
least squares. Robust standard errors (clustered at the campaign level) are reported in the parentheses
correcting for heteroscedasticity. There is no indication of multicollinearity within the regressions. The
dependent variable is log-transformed, which makes the coefficient for female investor a semi-elasticity. A
semi-elasticity gives the relative change in the proportion invested of the campaign target given that the
investor is female. Three stars, two stars, and one star represent statistical significance at 1 %, 5 %, and
10 %-level, respectively.The chosen level of significance for this analysis is set to 5 %.
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6.3 Homophily in investment decisions
Our third sub-analysis investigates whether female investors are more likely to choose
campaigns with female CEOs or female leads. A dummy notating whether a venture has
a female CEO or is female-led is the dependent variable. The dummy female investor is
again chosen as our independent variable, and we expected to observe a positive significant
relationship between female entrepreneurs and female investors. This will imply that there
is a gender-related difference in the choice of investing depending on the entrepreneurial
team, thus confirming the presence of homophily. Table 6.3 presents the results, and the
effects of controlling for company and investor specific variables, and further industry and
year effects that additionally may influence investment decisions.
Since our model is designed as a logit regression with a dummy on the left-hand side, the
interpretation of the coefficients is not as straight forward as in the two previous analyses.
Column (A) includes female investor as an explanatory variable and shows a positive
coefficient at a 1 % significance level. This suggests that there is a positive correlation
between female CEOs and female investors within our sample. However, we have not
controlled for other factors affecting the investment decision.
Columns (B) and (C) report how the coefficient changes when adding investor and firm
specific variables to our regression models. We see that the coefficient keeps its significance
level at 1 % but converging towards 0. Furthermore, we see that the marginal effect
decreases, which implies that the difference between female and male investors diminishes
when controlling for other variables, all other things being equal. When adding year
and industry effects in Column (D), our OLS estimates show a positive coefficient and
a significance level of 1 %. By interpreting the marginal effect, our results suggest that
female investors are 6 % more likely than males to choose ventures with a female CEO,
all other things being equal.
In Column (E), we expand the definition of the dependent variable and investigate whether
female investors are more likely to invest in campaigns that are female-led, meaning that
the CEO, CFO or founder(s) is female. Similar to column (D), the coefficient of female
investor is significant at the 1 % level, suggesting a highly positive correlation. When
looking at the marginal effect, female investors are 7 % more likely than males to invest
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in campaigns that are female-led, all other things being equal. The results from both
columns (D) and (E) provide strong supporting evidence in favour of H3.
Table 6.3: Analysis of homophily
Dependent variable:
Female CEO Female-led
Base Individual level Firm level Complete Complete
controls controls
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Female investor 1.152⇤⇤⇤ 1.020⇤⇤⇤ 0.791⇤⇤⇤ 0.838⇤⇤⇤ 0.754⇤⇤⇤
(0.123) (0.128) (0.171) (0.196) (0.178)
0.196 0.166 0.074 0.060 0.070
Investor age 0.023⇤⇤⇤ 0.017⇤⇤⇤ 0.020⇤⇤⇤ 0.025⇤⇤⇤
(0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Knowledge  0.077  0.117  0.086  0.113
(0.071) (0.091) (0.105) (0.091)
Experience  0.129⇤⇤  0.160⇤⇤  0.202⇤⇤  0.220⇤⇤⇤
(0.061) (0.077) (0.091) (0.077)
Investment frequency  0.005  0.008  0.089⇤⇤⇤
(0.008) (0.010) (0.019)
Valuation a  3.060⇤⇤⇤  2.972⇤⇤⇤  1.252⇤⇤⇤
(0.176) (0.193) (0.142)
Equity offering  0.183⇤⇤⇤  0.178⇤⇤⇤  0.034⇤⇤
(0.015) (0.018) (0.014)
Constant  1.855⇤⇤⇤  2.244⇤⇤⇤ 53.181⇤⇤⇤ 15.579 0.249
(0.070) (0.369) (3.144) (4,093.385) (3,752.778)
Industry effects No No No Yes Yes
Year effects No No No Yes Yes
Observations 2,189 2,189 2,189 2,189 2,189
Log Likelihood  973.343  956.281  600.392  477.423  590.196
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,950.686 1,922.562 1,216.784 992.845 1,218.392
Note: The table provides the estimates of the analysis concerning homophily, with the use of maximum
likelihood estimation. Compared to linear regression, logistic regression offers the advantage of not having
to satisfy the condition of homoscedasticity of the residuals (Domínguez-Almendros et al., 2011). We
therefore do not include robust standard errors clustered at the campaign level. However, when using
robust standard errors the result do not change. Further there is no indication of multicollinearity within
the regressions, and the third number for female investor is the marginal effect. Three stars, two stars,
and one star represent statistical significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 %-level, respectively.The chosen level
of significance for this analysis is set to 5 %.
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6.4 Robustness test
We want to address the possible worry that our results may be driven by individuals
that invest several times. Our sample consist of 1501 unique individuals conducting 2189
investments, and thus some investors are represented more than others. Hence, we want
to investigate whether our findings change when we restrict the sample to unique investors.
We observe that females have a higher share of unique individuals, where 78 % only made
one investment. Thus, we get a slight increase in the share of females when restricting the
sample to unique investors.
In column (A) table 6.4, we present the findings from the robustness test for the first
sub-analysis. We see that even though the sample is reduced substantially, the effect still
remains the same as in our initial result. The robustness test therefore suggests that
there is no gender difference in risk preferences when restricting the sample to unique
investors. Column (B) presents the second sub-analysis, and we observe a change in the
results compared to our initial findings. A negative coefficient at the 10 % significance
level suggests that unique female investors are less likely to herd compared to males.
Comparing the results of the robustness test with the main analysis, the difference in
herding behaviour between males and females is more evident when looking at unique
investors. However, the difference is still not statistically significant at a 5 % level.
In columns (C) and (D), we can observe the findings from the robustness test of our last
sub-analysis. When comparing the results to our initial findings, we do not observe any
change. Similar to the main findings, female investors are 6 and 7 % more likely to invest
in female CEOs and female-led ventures.
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Table 6.4: Robustness test
Dependent variable:
% Equity offering propotion inv. of campaingn target Female CEO Female-led
OLS OLS Logistic Logistic
Complete Complete Complete Complete
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Female investor 0.043  0.136⇤ 0.858⇤⇤⇤ 0.652⇤⇤⇤
(0.036) (0.071) (0.279) (0.221)
0.060 0.070
Investor age 0.001  0.006⇤ 0.019⇤⇤ 0.024⇤⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.003) (0.009) (0.007)
Knowledge  0.001 0.004  0.226  0.219⇤
(0.012) (0.036) (0.150) (0.114)
Experience  0.014  0.032  0.278⇤⇤  0.275⇤⇤⇤
(0.013) (0.034) (0.138) (0.104)
Investment frequency 0.007⇤  0.006  0.121⇤⇤⇤
(0.004) (0.014) (0.026)
Share of days passed 2.015⇤⇤⇤
(0.122)
Female CEO  0.479⇤⇤ 0.045
(0.214) (0.305)
Valuationa  0.402⇤⇤⇤  3.764⇤⇤⇤  1.764⇤⇤⇤
(0.122) (0.295) (0.201)
Equity offering  0.003  0.226⇤⇤⇤  0.033⇤
(0.027) (0.024) (0.018)
Constant 9.955⇤⇤⇤  4.567⇤⇤⇤ 36.625 10.214
(2.069) (0.890) (2,581.285) (1,502.603)
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust SE Yes Yes No No
Observations 1,501 1,501 1,501 1,501
R2 0.644 0.611
Adjusted R2 0.640 0.607
Log Likelihood  226.465  351.206
Akaike Inf. Crit. 488.931 738.412
Residual Std. Error 0.271 0.798
F Statistic 157.610⇤⇤⇤ 137.276⇤⇤⇤
(df = 17; 1483)
Note: This table provides the estimates of the robustness test, only including unique investors. For
the OLS regressions we include robust standard errors clustered at the campaign level. For the logistic
regressions we do not include robust standard errors, however the results do not change when using
robust standard errors clustered at the campaign level. The third number for the logistic regression is the
marginal effect. Three stars, two stars, and one star represent statistical significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10
%-level, respectively. The chosen level of significance for this analysis is set to 5 %.
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7 Insight from the investor sample
In this chapter we will present the main findings from the qualitative analysis, looking
more closely into secondary questionnaire data. From the survey, we gain insight into
investor characteristics, their interpretation of information on the platform and the main
motivation for investing. We will thus present our qualitative results, both in general
and taking into account the respondents’ gender, to enable a richer discussion in the next
chapter.
7.1 Investor characteristics and motivation
The motivation for investing is an important component for interpretation and further
discussion of our results. Even though equity crowdfunding investors are mainly financially
motivated (Baeck et al., 2014)(Cholakova & Clarysse, 2015), we want to confirm this, due
to the immature market in Norway. If the majority of the investors in our sample choose
campaigns based on intrinsic motivations such as wanting to support a local cause, or a
friend/family member, our results cannot solely be seen as “investment decisions”, and
will thus influence further interpretation.
Around 70 % of our 157 respondents answered that a positive return on invested capital
was their main motivation for investing via Dealflow, together with the wish to invest
capital in Norwegian start-up ventures. Only a small minority, answered that their main
motivation was to support a local firm or that they know the entrepreneur/team. This is
consistent when filtering for female respondents. Further, the majority (83 %) answered
that they pursue a thorough reading of the memorandum before an assessment of the
investment target. Together with a ticket mean of 20 670 NOK, this indicates a financial
purpose on the part of the majority of the Dealflow investors. This evidence supports the
relevance of our study of investment decisions, and further viability of our findings in an
investor context.
Furthermore, we see that the female respondents report slightly less experience than
males. Based on objective criteria, the majority of male investors indicated that they
are relatively experienced. We see that a higher number of female investors answered
that they have little or no experience of investing from the past. Because of our low (but
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representative) number of female respondents, we confirm this finding from the experience
score in our data sample. A simple t-test, shown in the descriptive data section, confirms
that the mean of female investor experience is lower than the mean of male investors, with
a significance level at 1 %. In addition, when asked about how many times they have
invested through Dealflow or another crowdfunding platform, we see a tendency that a
higher percentage of females have invested “only once”, compared to males. This is also
consistent with the female share in our sample, when filtering for unique investors in the
robustness test.
7.2 Risk assessment and investment choice
When asked whether they agree with the statement “A high % equity offering affects my
assessment of the investment in a positive way”, around 30 % of the investors support
our assumption from the theoretical background and earlier research evidence, stating
that they perceive the equity offered variable as a component of risk. Within this group,
approximately half and half see a high equity offered either negative or positive, depending
on what risk profile they see themselves aiming for. However, 53 % answered that they
do not think the variable “ % equity offered” necessarily is a component signalling risk.
16 % answered that they have paid no attention to this information while investing.
Filtering our answers on gender, our results show a small tendency towards more female
respondents answering that they do not know or have not seen this information. This
may support the fact that they are more inexperienced. However, because of our limited
respondent basis, we cannot state that this is a clear trend. To sum up, the results
from this question indicate that a proportion of our investor sample has not necessarily
evaluated equity offering as a risk component when deciding to invest, which we should
bear in mind when interpreting the results from the analysis of risk level.
When asking what criterion was most important for the investors in their prior investment(s)
decisions at the Dealflow platform, the vast majority stated that it was whether they
believed the venture could generate a positive return on invested capital. As they could
choose two criteria at this question, their belief in the entrepreneur/team and idea was
the second most important. This may indicate that even though they do not pursue an
investment based on quantitative information, the financial dimension is still the most
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important. The tendencies point in the same direction filtering for female respondents.
Seeing these three dominant criteria together, illustrated by figure 7.1, we can interpret
that the investors mainly look at the idea itself and the team/entrepreneur, to determine
which ventures will give them a positive return on invested capital, and choose thereafter.
Figure 7.1: Result from survey question 4
It is also important to mention that the criterion of idea, in particular product/service, is
also highlighted in open-ended options throughout the questionnaire. For instance, this
was not included as an option when asking about motivation, and respondents stated:
"I liked the product/service, and could imagine buying this myself. That’s the
most important reason (for investing)."
“I wanted to invest in something I believe in.”
“I believe in the product based on my subjective assessment of market potential."
This implies that a subjective interest in the product and idea itself is important and, from
our results, it is worth mentioning that product preference may vary between genders.
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7.3 Herding behaviour
The respondents were asked about the effect of prior investors on their decision making, by
indicating to what extent they agree that “My eagerness to invest in a campaign increases
when I see that others have invested before me”. While keeping in mind biases that may
occur while answering such questions, we see that the majority admitted to agreeing to
the fact that prior investors have a positive effect on their investment decisions.
Figure 7.2: Result from survey question 6
Against this, 40 % of the respondents indicated that they are indifferent about whether
there are prior investors or they do not care about this information. However, herding
is not “a bias” for nothing, and literature suggests that individuals often unconsciously
adopt the behaviour of others without explicitly recognising why they chase the similar
trends as everybody else (Fenzl & Pelzmann, 2012). It is thus hard to know whether the
investors are answering based on a wish for rationality, or actual empirical truth. We do
not see a change in tendency when filtering on investor gender.
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8 Discussion
This chapter will discuss our analyses’ results in relation to both insight from our investor
sample and contextual background knowledge. First, we will discuss our first two results
partly in relation to each other, before discussing the third analysis’ results. Next, we
will present our overall research limitations. Lastly, thoughts on the implications of our
findings for Dealflow and other practitioners will be provided.
8.1 Gender-related differences in risk and herding behaviour
From the first analysis the results show surprisingly that there is no statistical evidence
that female investors choose companies with lower levels of risk, compared to males. We
expected females to be more risk averse than men, but the results are contradictory and
reject our hypothesis. The quantitative findings therefore suggest a neutralised gender
difference in risk-taking within our context. Our second results show, also surprisingly,
that there is no statistical evidence that female investors exhibit herding behaviour to a
greater extent than males. Rather, our results show a slight tendency that female investors
on average tend to invest in a campaign earlier, yet not with a significant difference. As
we assumed that less confident and risk-averse females would, to a greater extent, lean on
the decisions of others, we reject this hypothesis as well. Thus, female risk-aversion is also
absent when measuring risk-taking with the effect of herding.
Even though whether to interpret herding behaviour as an action of risk aversion or an
expression for other conditions can be discussed, we see that a difference between genders
is neutralised. It is therefore safe to say there is no evidence from our quantitative results
that women take less risks than men in investment decisions within our context. As both
our findings are the opposite from the majority of previous research, it is important to
discuss plausible explanations behind our results. We will therefore first discuss these
two results related to female risk aversion, and then lastly examine the results of herding
behaviour more closely.
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8.1.1 Female risk aversion in a gender equal society
As stated in chapter 3, previous studies show that when adjusting for potential drivers
that could foster gender differences in the first place, female risk aversion is actually not
so evident (Harikanth & Pragathi, 2013)(Nelson, 2015)(Dwyer et al., 2002)(Hibbert et al.,
2008). As we have had the opportunity to control for factors such as investor experience,
financial knowledge etc., a first explanation for gender neutralisation could be that there
simply is no gender difference in risk aversion within our sample. This may also be the
reason why we observe results which contradicts those of Hervé et al. (2019), who suggests
female risk aversion in a similar crowdfunding environment, as they has neither controlled
for financial knowledge nor investor experience.
Moreover, as we are examining a sample from a population with a gender-equal societal
structure, our findings can be explained by the fact that gender-related differences in
risk are present to a lesser extent than we are taught from a biological point of view
(Kaplan & Walley, 2016). Indeed, research that has investigated gender differences in
risk-taking related to social and cultural structures suggests that society systematically
shapes different risk preferences between genders (Felton et al., 2003)(Slovic, 1966)(Byrnes
et al., 1999). Furthermore, research suggest that gender differences in risk are responsive
to social change and indicates that, for example, the feminist movement in the 1970s led
to substantial increases in the number of female entrepreneurs (Masters & Meier, 1988).
Struewing and Jirjahn (2019) supports this view of gender risk-difference with a new
study. Their findings indicate that more gender-equal societal structures in East Germany
compared to West Germany have resulted in smaller gender differences in risk taking
(Struewing & Jirjahn, 2019)(The Economist, 2020). As Norway is relatively gender equal
in comparison with other countries in terms of labour participation rates, overall wealth,
culture and political structure (OECD, 2018), we could expect similar results within our
sample when able to control for differences caused by the lack of financial experience and
knowledge. From this, it can be inferred that recent studies in more gender-equal countries
will show that women do not necessarily have an inherent risk aversion in comparison to
men, and that women would take more risk if they had more knowledge, experience and
wealth.
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If the case was that a gender-equal culture has come to neutralise gender differences in risk
tolerance, one could assume that this would also be the case for our Nordic neighbours.
With this said, Mohammadi and Shafi (2018) still finds evidence of female risk aversion,
even when taking experience into account. Their findings suggest that female investors
in Swedish equity crowdfunding have a tendency to choose campaigns with a lower risk
level. However, their control for experience may not be sufficient as their proxy is based
on previous investments on the particular platform used. Thus, they may not have
been able to control for actual investor experience, neither previous financial knowledge.
Furthermore, we have limited insight into their specific data sample from a platform with
slightly different characteristics to Dealflow’s. The Swedish crowdfunding market is also,
as mentioned, more mature compared to the Norwegian one, which can cause different
characteristics in the market. Thus, we cannot compare it directly.
8.1.2 The influence of investor characteristics and less female experience
Our results could also potentially be explained by the investor sample in general, and how
they interpret information components given on the platform. We have already stressed
in chapter 2 that early-stage investing relies more on qualitative components, and that
crowdfunding investors have limited resources and time to do a thorough due diligence.
Even though earlier research and literature has stated that a high % equity offered implies
risk (Leland & Pyle, 1977)(Mohammadi & Shafi, 2018), an uncertainty as to whether
Dealflow’s investor pool interprets this information in that specific way can be raised.
From our investor insight, we get an indication that an ambiguous interpretation might be
the case, as half of our respondents answered that they do not necessarily look at “equity
offered” as a signal of risk. Even though a proportion of 40 % actually answered that they
interpret it as a risk component, supporting our findings’ validity, we have to take this
into further consideration.
Going further with the interpretation of campaign components, an unexpected risk
neutralisation between genders could be related to experience, as we cannot know for sure
how an inexperienced investor actually views specific information relatively to others. We
have confirmed from the quantitative data and qualitative analysis that females have a
slightly lower experience level than males, which can affect their behaviour and investment
decisions. From a discussion with Professor Rotem Shneor and PhD candidate Priscilla
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Serwaah (2020), a question to be highlighted is how inexperience may influence female
investors’ choices in a way as yet unaccounted for. Our assumption underpinning the
first hypothesis was that females would exhibit risk-averse behaviour from choosing more
“secure firms” with lower equity offering. However, this does not necessarily have to be
how we observe risk averse females, as inexperience in these kinds of investment decisions
can influence the interpretation of information. For instance, inexperienced investors may
believe that a high equity offered is a sign of quality, and thus that the venture is less
risky.
8.2 Females do not necessarily follow the crowd
Interpretations of quantitative information are relevant issues to discuss regarding analysing
the equity offered component, but do not serve as a sufficient explanatory option for the
results in herding behaviour. In chapter 3, we presented the theory that early movers
tend to be more confident in their own judgements and thus less risk averse, and that
we expect female investors to enter campaigns relatively later than males. We observe
similar herding behaviour between genders, which is contradicting to literature, thus our
findings suggest more confident females than first anticipated. We therefore should explore
plausible reasons for an investment behaviour which suggests similar confidence to males.
A possible explanation that we cannot observe directly from our quantitative results is
why and how women choose investment targets on such a crowdfunding platform. A
greater share of female investors could potentially enter this platform for a one-investment
only, motivated by investing in a specific firm or entrepreneur. Thus, they have less
need for time to assess information, or to observe whether others invest or not. Our
data sample restricted to unique investor individuals shows that 80 % of females only
carry out one investment, compared to 66 % males, also supported by the insight from
investor. This confirms that our findings can be explained by tendencies that a greater
proportion of females have entered the platform for one particular investment, relative
to males in our sample. As our insight from investors does not imply that this is the
result of supporting “causes” such as local firms or a network, a pre-determined investment
could more likely be motivated by, for instance, a commercial, as Dealflow do targeted
marketing. In addition, entrepreneurs may contact potential investors directly before the
campaign date, which could lead to a pre-determined investment choice. This explanation
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is supported by Dealflow, pointing out that female entrepreneurs, to a larger extent, reach
out to their existing network in advance of a funding campaign (Tonning & Grindheim,
2020).
Lastly, the neutralised herding behaviour can also be explained by relatively experienced
male investors. Our hypothesis is underpinned by the assumption that female investors
have less confidence and will therefore wait to observe the crowd. However, it is not
necessarily a bad idea to wait and see if the campaign gets traction, as it could be
time-consuming to not invest in a campaign that most likely will not reach its campaign
target. Inexperienced investors may rush too soon into an investment. Nevertheless, this
remains speculation, as literature points to that less confident investors are more prone to
herding behaviour, and confident investors enter an investment earlier (Busenitz & Barney,
1997)(Palich & Bagby, 1995). In addition, literature also points to that less proficient
investors are more prone to biases, and therefore supports that the less experienced
females should follow the crowd to a larger extent (Hon-Snir et al., 2012). However, the
literature also takes the basis that females are consistently more risk-averse, so this might
not necessarily be true within our context.
8.3 The influence of homophily in investment decisions
Our last analysis provides significant statistical evidence that confirms a positive correlation
between female investors and ventures with female entrepreneurs. From our descriptive
statistics, we presented that campaigns with a female CEO on average received 38.4 % of
their total investment counts from female investors, even though female investors only
make up 20.3 % of our sample. We can therefore state that the gender difference within
these figures can be partly explained by the homophily effect. As seen from literature and
findings from similar studies, a positive relationship is not surprising, and supports our
initial assumptions.
When controlling for potential gender-related preferences for certain industries and
potential female investor correlated characteristics (Oranburg & Geiger, 2019), we aim
to measure the isolated effect of gender-related homophily. Moreover, we notice that the
marginal effect decreases from 19 % in column (A) to 6 % in column (D) when adding
control variables step by step in table 6.3, implying that correlating effects other than the
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entrepreneur gender itself might cause the majority of the first apparent differences. With
this in mind, it is further important to address the fact that other systematic tendency
differences between genders might surpass our chosen controls, and the level of homophily
could be affected by other unobserved determinants than gender.
First, several respondents from our investor insight explicitly stated that they invest
in ideas and products they believe in and could have use of themselves. It could be
assumed that the specific product or service the venture offers appeals to certain gender-
related preferences, or simply recognition. Research confirms this, suggesting that a
majority of investors do not value ideas they do not see a personal need for, even when
evidence indicates that it is good business (Mollick & Robb, 2016). When examining
the female investor share for campaigns within our data sample, the ones highest ranked
are campaigns such as LOKAL, Lokalmatportalen, VILLOID and Boldbooks. These are
ventures that offers products that can be assumed to appeal to females such as healthy
organic food, baby clothing and book publishing. In addition, all these ventures have
either a female CEO or a female lead. In contrast, Tuckify, have attracted one of the
highest shares of female investors at 50 % with their children’s clothing subscription,
but do not have a female lead. From this, it can be assumed that gender differences in
preferences for product therefore could have an impact on investment decisions, and our
results should be viewed with this in mind.
Second, a few respondents also addressed the motivation for choosing ventures based on
their greater purpose, such as their potential to offer sustainable solutions. As literature
suggests that these might be venture characteristics that attract female investors (Oranburg
& Geiger, 2019), this is also a factor that could impact genders differently in choosing
investments.
Even though it will be nuances within the presence of homophily that we cannot capture,
our findings provide evidence confirming the presence of this phenomenon within our
research context. As elaborated in sections 2 and 3, equity crowdfunding has a major
potential for facilitating increased female participation on both sides of the innovation
sector by overcoming challenges traditionally faced in venture capital funding (Wang et
al., 2019). Moreover, our results emphasize the value of crowdfunding platforms in the
ongoing work towards closing: 1. the gender funding gap and 2. gender investment gap,
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through an increased share of female investors. Female entrepreneurs benefit from an
increased pool of potential investors disregarding geographical location, investor network
and social capital, and female investors benefit from a convenient process and access to
an open platform with investment cases. Thus, as the share of female investors increases,
in general and potentially in particular in equity crowdfunding, the presence of homophily
will benefit female entrepreneurs and hopefully result in narrowing the funding gap for
female-led ventures.
8.4 Limitations
There are several limitations in our research that we should keep in mind when interpreting
the results. In the following, we will discuss limitations related to the quality of the
data on which we base our analyses, before further discussing limitations related to the
methodology.
8.4.1 Data quality
In order to provide precise and valid results, it is important to have a sufficient data sample.
Due to the rather immature market of Norwegian equity crowdfunding, the data sample
is restricted to one up-and-coming platform. Furthermore, we observe varying quality in
the data, as observations in the first campaigns have certain limited characteristics due
to platform legitimacy. A limitation for the analyses could therefore be the availability
and newness of data, which can constrict the quality of the results. However, we should
mention that the sample consists of 2189 observations which, for research purposes, is
considered to be a sufficient size.
8.4.2 Limitations related to research design
Our research is limited in that the variables chosen might capture other aspects relevant
to female decision-making than risk assessment, herding behaviour and the influence of
homophily. With this shortcoming, it is therefore interesting to complement our study with
research further exploring investors’ choice within similar contexts. For example, we do not
take social and networking factors into consideration. Hervé et al. (2019) provide notable
results on this subject, showing that social interactions have a strong influence on investors’
choices. They highlight a tendency that social interactions counteract the uncertainty
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surroundings of equity crowdfunding, where the more sociable investors invest higher
ticket sizes in risky securities. To offer insights into the domain of equity crowdfunding,
future research could therefore benefit from applying other decision-making and judgment
theories.
Furthermore, the specific measures used in this study may not have fully captured the
desired element we sought to explore. This is especially relevant for the analysis using the
risk proxy of equity offering. Our study only includes one proxy for risk, which raises the
concern that within our context, the finding may therefore reflect a spurious correlation.
To detect this potential issue, one should investigate whether the finding is consistent
across several measurements of risk. In addition, it is important to keep in mind that our
study aims to explore human decisions. Quantifying and choosing representative measures
of evaluation done by the human brain will often be influenced by complex situational
factors, and must be taken into account as a limitation.
Lastly, there are limitations to the generalisability of the results outside of our context.
Our research is based on investments within one country, only representing one platform.
It is possible that institutional conditions of the Norwegian market, or the platform,
might influence the results of our study. Norway is considered to be one of the most
gender-equal countries in the world, in addition to our status as a high-income country.
The findings may therefore not be representative for countries with different political and
legal systems. Given the young market of equity crowdfunding, these limitations also
occur for the platform on which we base our study. There seem to be large differences in
platforms and their business models across countries (Mohammadi & Shafi, 2018), and
care must be taken when generalising the findings across both time and location.
8.5 Implications for Dealflow and equity crowdfunding
practitioners
Our findings contributes with increased knowledge about female investment decisions
related to crowdfunding in entrepreneurial finance. While most elements of our results
might be outside the control of equity crowdfunding campaigners and facilitators, increased
insights about investors’ decision-making could be altered in their favour. Assuming that
there is a collective strive for a more gender equal investor pool, as well as more funding
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allocated to female entrepreneurs - our research therefore has potential implications at a
managerial level for Dealflow and other practitioners within this specific context.
From a investor perspective, platforms can reduce biases and improve investment decisions
by providing more information. This could be done by, for instance, introducing a
independent third party that can provide a professional opinion about the valuation
and risk related to a company. They could also expand their business model to offer
this as an extra service to inexperienced investors who want to take a more informed
decision. As inexperience or lack of resources might be a constraint for individual investors
in equity crowdfunding in general, this could be an helpful measure to improve and
professionalise decisions. Moreover, if females are hesitant to start investing due to relative
inexperience, providing a professional evaluation or additional service might attract more
female investors to the platform.
Crowdfunding platforms can also further improve funding processes and campaigns,
for both female and male entrepreneurs. By communicating more accurate information
regarding investor decisions, the platforms can provide an option to target specific segments
based on product type or other characteristics of the venture. Moreover, our findings
may suggest that females to a greater extent make a pre-determined investment decision
and/or are more confident than earlier anticipated. This information can be of importance
when designing the commercial process and launching a campaign, and further used as a
measure to attract more female investors.
Furthermore, stereotypes of female investors is still highly present in funding settings
(Kaplan & Walley, 2016), which could have an impact on the specific audience the
entrepreneur want to target. In that sense, the platforms facilitating the funding process
can be said to have a responsible role and should strive to provide accurate and unbiased
information for improvement. With increased knowledge about female investors in equity
crowdfunding, actors such as Dealflow therefore are positioned to potentially bring about
change in inherent biases from stereotyping.
From a broader perspective, insight provided from our research to crowdfunding
practitioners, can also have specific value for female presence in entrepreneurial finance. As
mentioned, the presence of homophily in combination with the potential to democratising
investing through crowdfunding, could result in more funding to female entrepreneurs
8.5 Implications for Dealflow and equity crowdfunding practitioners 53
in the coming years. Dealflow reports a growth for 2020 that already has doubled its
2019 figures, and the interest from females is not to be faulted. Regarding this, it is
important to highlight that the logic of homophily is indeed a two-way street. Dealflow and
other facilitators need to retain female entrepreneurs, so that they also can attract more
investors with female-represented investment cases. In the long run, this self-reinforcing
effect could result in increased successful female ventures, as they potentially can receive




By examining investors in the context of Norwegian equity crowdfunding, this research
has provided insight within aspects regarding gender-related differences in investment
decisions. Initially, we recognised that there exist differences looking at investments
from a gender perspective, and our analyses aim to add insight on what actually might
distinguish female investors from males. Through quantitative analyses we have used data
from Dealflow to examine how female and male investors differs in investment decisions
related to risk, herding behavior and homophily. The insight from our particular investor
sample has impelled a better understanding of our quantitative results, as well as fostered
thoughts about contextual limitations and implications.
In our first two analyses we found that there is no evident difference in the choice of
venture risk level, as well as no significant difference in herding behavior between female
and male investors. The tendencies rather suggests more risk taking and confident female
investors than first assumed. Our findings rejects the first two hypotheses and are contrary
to previous research, which motivates a discussion of potential explanations in relation
to our investor sample insight. Through our last analysis we investigate the presence of
homophily in female investment decisions, and find that female investors are more likely
to choose ventures with female entrepreneurs compared to males. This confirms our third
hypothesis, and we further discuss nuances within our results based on insight from the
investor sample as well. In particular, this discussion highlights the potential impact for
female entrepreneurs seeking equity crowdfunding.
Explicitly answering our research question, our findings suggest that assumed differences
of risk aversion and herding behavior between female and male investors are naturalised
in equity crowdfunding. We provide evidence for that differences in investment-decisions
rather are influence by the effect of homophily between investor and the entrepreneur. It
is important to keep in mind limitations and constraints with our findings. However, we
hope that our results can be utilised by practitioners within the field of entrepreneurial
finance, in particular crowdfunding facilitators, in the strive for a more gender-equal
investing environment.
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9.1 Research implications
Increased knowledge is highly relevant going forward in closing the gender investment gap.
Our contribution to existing knowledge about female investors could be used by various
players, to tailor and pivot products to better suit females. Suggesting that female and
male investors are similar in risk taking - both in terms of the choice of ventures, but also
when following the crowd’s decisions - our findings are contrary to stereotypes typically
assigned to females. In financial settings this constitutes a key implication, and it might
be important to recognise that there are certain contexts where genders do not necessarily
differ in risk taking. As stated in our limitations, the results might not be generalised to
investment decisions in other financial contexts, but still give an important contribution
to existing figures.
Even though our results are context specific, we would like to carefully add that the
discussion of whether a gender-egalitarian society neutralises risk differences can also
can serve as food for thought outside the scope of this thesis. Stereotypical picturing of
females as generally more risk averse and less confident could cause inherent unfavourable
biases in several societal settings. Thus, our findings can be insightful for other countries,
striving for a more gender equal society going forward.
9.2 Further research
The discussion of our findings and potential implications opens up avenues for future
research. We suggest research to continue to explore nuances of risk preferences between
genders in financial settings in gender equal societies. An important factor is to be able
to control for initial drivers for differences in investment decisions, to isolate the actual
risk preference. In investment settings this will preferably be financial knowledge and
previous experience. It could be interesting to examine more professional individual
decision-making of females in the early-stage ecosystem, and female risk preference when
controlling for, for example, years of experience and confidence in financial decisions.
The high-risk component within our setting has also not been examined in particular,
and further research could compare our results with other low-risk contexts to reveal
differences between investing environments.
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From an evidently explosive growth of crowdfunding platforms, it will be interesting to
follow the further development of alternative financing sources. Moreover, it will be for
time to tell whether the democratisation potential we have highlighted, in combination
with the presence of homophily, actually fosters an increased share of females on both the
entrepreneurship and investor side in equity crowdfunding.
This being said, we would lastly like to highlight the potential of examining similar samples
of rich data to get increased knowledge about female investment decisions. Investing
enabled by technology-based platforms offers the advantage to retrieve multiple variables
and explore new aspects of how individuals make decisions in a non-professional setting.
As crowdfunding and tech-enabled platforms grow their female user-base, we see that new
opportunities for insightful research arise.
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Appendix
A1 No perfect collinearity
In the following we will touch upon the assumption of no multicollinearity for the models
in our analyses. The assumption address no perfect correlation between the independent
variables (Wooldridge, 2016). In table A1.1, A1.3 and A1.5 we present the Pearson
correlation coefficients between the variables. The tables suggest that most variables
are correlated, however, multicollinearity is not a problem since an absolute correlation
coefficient above 0.8 indicates the presence of multicollinearity (Kumari, 2008).
Further we use the variance inflation factor (VIF) to measure the severity of
multicollinearity in the regression analyses. The higher VIF statistics, the higher the
correlation is between the variables. The threshold is often sat to 5 or 10, and by examining
the VIF statistics reported for the analyses, there is thus no sign of multicollonarity (Neter
et al., 1985).
Table A1.1: Pearson correlation matrix sub-analysis 1
Female inv. Age inv. Knowledge Female CEO Experience Valuation Inv. frequency
Female inv. 1 0.099 -0.064 0.207 -0.227 -0.154 -0.070
Age inv 0.099 1 -0.023 0.131 -0.028 -0.103 -0.132
Knowledge -0.064 -0.023 1 -0.051 0.251 0.017 -0.097
Female CEO 0.207 0.131 -0.051 1 -0.099 -0.415 -0.231
Experience -0.227 -0.028 0.251 -0.099 1 0.018 -0.142
Valuation 0.154 0.103 0.017 -0.415 0.018 1 0.427
Inv. frequency 0.070 0.132 0.097 0.231 0.142 0.427 1
Table A1.2: VIF-test sub-analysis 1
GVIF Df GVIF (̂1/(2∗Df))
Female inv. 1.122 1 1.059
Age inv. 1.069 1 1.034
Knowledge 1.084 1 1.041
Experience 1.210 1 1.100
Inv. frequency 1.735 1 1.317
Female CEO 1.742 1 1.320
Valuation 2.936 1 1.713
Industrial classification 3.966 9 1.080
Year 1.451 2 1.098
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Table A1.3: Pearson correlation matrix sub-analysis 2
Equity off. Female inv. Age inv. Knowledge Female CEO Experience Share of days passed
Equity off. 1 0.034 -0.000 -0.057 -0.059 -0.011 -0.004
Female inv. 0.034 1 0.099 -0.064 0.207 -0.227 -0.064
Age inv. -0.000 0.099 1 -0.023 0.131 -0.028 -0.049
Knowledge -0.057 -0.064 -0.023 1 -0.051 0.251 -0.019
Female CEO -0.059 0.207 0.131 -0.051 1 -0.099 -0.087
Experience -0.011 -0.227 -0.028 0.251 -0.099 1 -0.022
Share of days passed -0.004 -0.064 -0.049 -0.019 -0.087 -0.022 1
Table A1.4: VIF-test sub-analysis 2
GVIF Df GVIF (̂1/(2∗Df))
Female inv. 1.127 1 1.062
Age inv. 1.060 1 1.029
Knowledge 1.078 1 1.038
Experience 1.195 1 1.093
Share of days passed 1.056 1 1.027
Female CEO 1.411 1 1.188
Equity off. 1.706 1 1.306
Industrial classification 2.545 9 1.053
Year 1.498 2 1.106
Table A1.5: Pearson correlation matrix sub-analysis 3
Female inv. Age Inv. Knowledge Experience Valuation Equity off. Inv. frequency
Female inv. 1.00 0.10 -0.06 -0.23 -0.16 0.03 -0.07
Age inv. 0.10 1.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.12 -0.00 -0.13
Knowledge -0.06 -0.02 1.00 0.25 0.01 -0.06 -0.10
Experience -0.23 -0.03 0.25 1.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.14
Valuation -0.16 -0.12 0.01 0.01 1.00 -0.34 0.44
Equity off. 0.03 -0.00 -0.06 -0.01 -0.34 1.00 0.24
Inv. frequency -0.07 -0.13 -0.10 -0.14 0.44 0.24 1.00
Table A1.6: VIF-test sub-analysis 3 (Female CEO)
GVIF Df GVIF^(1/(2*Df))
Female inv. 1.12 1.00 1.06
Age inv. 1.05 1.00 1.03
Knowledge 1.06 1.00 1.03
Experience 1.26 1.00 1.12
Inv. frequency 1.12 1.00 1.06
Valuation 1.94 1.00 1.39
Equity off. 1.99 1.00 1.41
Industrial classification 1.51 9.00 1.02
Year 1.33 2.00 1.07
A2 Homoscedasticity 65
Table A1.7: VIF-test sub-analysis 3 (Female-led)
GVIF Df GVIF^(1/(2*Df))
Female inv. 1.09 1.00 1.05
Age inv. 1.04 1.00 1.02
Knowledge 1.05 1.00 1.03
Experience 1.16 1.00 1.08
Inv. frequency 1.20 1.00 1.10
Valuation 1.40 1.00 1.18
Equity off. 1.53 1.00 1.24
Industrial classification 1.48 9.00 1.02
Year 1.55 2.00 1.12
A2 Homoscedasticity
To test for heteroskedasticity we use the Breusch pagan test for the models in analyses 1
and 2. A p-value below 5% will indicate that the assumption of homoscedasticity do not
hold (Breusch & Pagan, 1979). A2.1 shows that the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity
is rejected for both models, and we therefore have a problem with heteroskedasticity. As
mentioned we use clustered robust errors to account for this problem.
Table A2.1: Breusch pagan test
Risk taking analyis Herding behavior analysis
BP 519.376 251.821
p.value 8.76e-99 3.47e-43
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We further include the third analysis including that robust standard errors clustered at
the campaign level. This illustrate that the results are consistent and do not change.
Table A3.1: Analysis of homophily with robust standard errors
Dependent variable:
Female CEO Female-led
Base Individual level Firm level Complete Complete
controls controls
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Female investor 1.152⇤⇤⇤ 1.020⇤⇤⇤ 0.791⇤⇤⇤ 0.838⇤⇤⇤ 0.754⇤⇤⇤
(0.138) (0.147) (0.078) (0.069) (0.082)
Investor age 0.023⇤⇤⇤ 0.017⇤⇤⇤ 0.020⇤⇤⇤ 0.025⇤⇤⇤
(0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Knowledge  0.077  0.117⇤⇤⇤  0.086⇤⇤⇤  0.113⇤⇤⇤
(0.050) (0.028) (0.026) (0.031)
Experience  0.129⇤  0.160⇤⇤⇤  0.202⇤⇤⇤  0.220⇤⇤⇤
(0.072) (0.034) (0.026) (0.031)
Investment frequency  0.005  0.008  0.089⇤⇤⇤
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
Valuation  3.060⇤⇤⇤  2.972⇤⇤⇤  1.252⇤⇤⇤
(0.201) (0.235) (0.287)
Equity offering  0.183⇤⇤⇤  0.178⇤⇤⇤  0.034
(0.018) (0.024) (0.030)
Constant  1.855⇤⇤⇤  2.244⇤⇤⇤ 53.181⇤⇤⇤ 15.579⇤⇤⇤ 0.249
(0.249) (0.652) (3.601) (4.346) (5.314)
Industry effects No No No Yes Yes
Year effects No No No Yes Yes
Robust SE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,189 2,189 2,189 2,189 2,189
Log Likelihood  973.343  956.281  600.392  477.423  590.196
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,950.686 1,922.562 1,216.784 992.845 1,218.392
Siginificanse levels ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
A4 Survey
Table A4.1 presents an overview of the questions included in the survey, in addition to
the distribution across the options for the hole sample, female and male investors. Keep
in mind that for question 2 and 4, respondents were able to choose two options at once.
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Table A4.1: Overview of survey and answers
Questions Options All Males Females
1. How many times have you invested
through Dealflow or other
crowdfunding platforms?
Only once 39.49% 37.31% 54.55%
2-3 times 28.03% 29.10% 22.73%
Several times 32.48% 33.58% 22.73%
2. What has been/is your main
motivation to invest in unlisted
companies? Select a maximum
of alternatives.
I wish to support a firm because
I know the entrepreneur/ team 10.19% 11.19% 4.55%
I wish to support a local firm 5.10% 4.48% 9.09%
I wish to invest in securities
with higher risk and a potential
higer return than funds/shares
65.61% 67.16% 54.55%
I wish to invest in capital in
Norwegian start-up ventures 68.15% 66.42% 77.27%
Other (please specify) 13.38% 14.18% 9.09%
3. To what extent have you done
an informed assessment prior
to the investment(s) through
Dealflow?
I have only glanced over the
memorandum, but have
been in contact with the
entrepreneur/company
10.83% 9,70% 18.18%
I have read the memorandum
quite thoroughly and conducted
an qualitative assessment based
on this information
62.42% 62.69% 63.64%
I have read the memorandum very
thoroughly and invested based on
both qualitative and quantitative
assessments
19.75% 21.64% 4.55%
I have not read the memorandum,
but know the entrepreneur/ company
form before
7.01% 5.97% 13.64%
4. Which criterion do you see as the most
important when you invest in an unlisted
company? Select a maximum
of two options.
Whether I believe in the team and
the entrepreneur 49.68% 50.00% 50.00%
Whether I think the idea is exciting 56.05% 53.73% 68.18%
Whether I think the current financial
position looks promising 4.46% 5.22% 0%
Whether I think the investment can
lead to a positive return in the long
run
67.52% 69.40% 54.55%
Whether the company contributes
positively to the local community 4.46% 4.48% 4.55%
Another criterion (please specify) 3.18% 2.99% 4.55%
5. When you are considering to invest in an
unlisted company, to what extent do you
agree with the following statement:
"A high %-equity offered has a positive
effect on my investment assessment "?
Agree, I wish to maximise the risk
and thus a high %-equity offered
counts positively in my assessment
11.46% 11.19% 13.64%
Agree, I wish to minimize the risk
and thus a high %-equity offered
counts positively in my assessment
3.82% 3.73% 4.55%
Disagree, I wish to minimize the risk
and thus a high %-equity offered
counts negatively in my assessment
16.56% 16.42% 18.18%
I do not necessarily associate this
information with risk 52.23% 55.22% 31.82%
I do not know, I did not look at
this information before investing 15.92% 13.43% 31.82%
6.To what extent do you agree with the
statement "My eagerness to invest in
a campaign increases when I see that
others have invested before me"?
Strongly agree 10.19% 8.96% 18.18%
Agree 46.50% 50.00% 27.27%
Neither 25.48% 24.63% 27.27%
Disagree 3.82% 3.73% 4.55%
I do not care about this information 14.01% 12.69% 22.73%
7. To what extent are you familiar
with investments from before?
Quite experienced, I work in a finance
related profession / I am an investor 24.84% 26.12% 18.18%
Relatively experienced, I have invested
in funds/shares in my spare time and am
interested in the topic
41.40% 44.03% 22.73%
Somewhat experienced, I have invested
in stocks/funds in my spare time 24.20% 20.90% 45.45%
Not very, I am relatively inexperienced 9.55% 8.96% 13.64%
8. Please state your gender
Female 14.01% 0% 100%
Male 85.35% 100% 0
I prefer not to answer 0.64%
9. Please state your age
20-35 years 22.29% 21.64% 27.27%
36-50 years 42.68% 41.04% 54.55%
50+ years 35.03% 37.31% 18.18%
